June 1940
General Events
| 3 | June | British and French forces completed their evacuation from Dunkirk. |
| 10 | June | Italian declaration of war effective at midnight 10/11 June. |
| 14 | June | French cruisers bombarded Vado. |
| 21 | June | The French battleship Lorraine and a British cruiser force bombarded Bardia. |
| 25 | June | The French armistice came into effect. |
| 26 | June | Italian destroyers bombarded Sollum. |
| 28 | June | Air Marshal Italo Balbo was killed when his aircraft was shot down over Tobruk after Italian antiaircraft batteries mistook it for an enemy. |
On 28 May 1940, Admiral Falangola, in command of Maricosom, issued orders for his submarines to be ready to take up station in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This was not the first order issued by Maricosom: on 20 November 1939, following tensions with France, operation orders were issued, preparing Italian submarines for an imminent war with England and France but then postponed. One of the orders stated that a minefield was to be laid off Bizerte at the outset of the war. This was not implemented the following June as minelaying in the Central Mediterranean was left to surface units. The Italian Armed Forces were subordinated to the Stato Maggiore Generale (STAMAGE, also referred to as Comando Supremo), headed by Field Marshal Badoglio. It was the equivalent of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) in Germany. The Regia Marina’s outlook on the war would reflect this subordination to the Military. To obtain better co-operation with the new allies, Rear-Admiral Eberhard Weichold of the German Navy assumed the role of Chief Liaison Officer in Rome.
In London and Paris, the war was not unexpected. The British Naval Attaché in Rome had even ventured that Italian submarines were ordered to proceed to the Balearic Islands and Cadiz where they were to establish bases (signal of 23 May). These rumours were unfounded.
Submarines were ordered to attack enemy warships and transports by day and any vessel navigating without lights by night. Initially, the deployment was to be formed by fifty-eight submarines in the Mediterranean and four in the Atlantic. Some were unavailable because of defects, and the final orders were issued for fifty-five submarines in the Mediterranean and two in the Atlantic. By 11 June, sixty-one submarines were on their way or already on patrol (including four in the Red Sea but only one in the Atlantic), but enemy traffic was scarce.
On 14 June, Maricosom instructed the submarines to be very careful in the wording of their signals. ‘Attacato’ (attacked) would indicate that the target was attacked, but the result was unobserved. ‘Silurato’ (torpedoed) implied an explosion was heard indicating a hit, but the sinking could not be confirmed. ‘Affondato’ (sunk) meant that the target was observed to sink. The broad meaning of ‘Silurato’ would lead to excessive claims as a depth-charge explosion would sometimes be interpreted as a torpedo hit. But Italian submariners were not alone in this respect.
Patrols were short, and by 17 June, only thirty-three submarines were still at sea in the Mediterranean. Still, British Naval Intelligence greatly underestimated their strength and assumed that only twelve were on patrol. For the period of 18-20 June, they revised their estimates to twenty on patrol when the actual number was thirty-four.
Italian submarine organisation in June 1940
In June 1940, the Italian submarine fleet was organised into eight Flotillas or Groups (Grupsom for Gruppo Sommergibili) divided into thirty-two squadrons (Squadriglie), totaling 115 submarines under Maricosom led by Admiral Mario Falangola, who was succeeded on 10 December 1941 by Admiral Antonio Legnani. In August 1940, Admiral Romeo Oliva was appointed as second in command until April 1943, when he went on to lead a naval division. The organisation was very centralised, with orders issued directly from Rome, and the flotilla leader was mostly relegated to an administrative role. However, the importance of the Atlantic Theatre of operation meant that the command of the Betasom flotilla was initially assigned to Admiral Parona who had a degree of autonomy from Rome. The remoteness of the Red Sea and Leros-based (Dodecanese) submarines also implied a certain degree of autonomy.
Seventeen submarines were lost before the end of October 1940, and, starting at the end of summer, twenty-nine submarines would be assigned to join Betasom based in Bordeaux and operate in the Atlantic theatre (later supplemented by four submarines from Massawa). Of these, twenty-eight made the difficult Gibraltar crossing before the end of 1940, except one (Ammiraglio Cagni), who arrived in 1942. A midget submarine (C.A.2) would be sent by railway to Bordeaux to be mounted piggyback on the submarine Leonardo da Vinci for a planned attack on New York. Trials were not satisfactory, and the operation never came to fruition.
I Grupsom (La Spezia, C.F. Aldo Cocchia)
11 Squadron: Calvi, Finzi, Tazzoli, Fieramosca.
12 Squadron: Cappellini, Faà di Bruno, Mocenigo, Veniero, Glauco, Otaria.
13 Squadron: Berillo, Onice, Gemma.
14 Squadron: Iride, Argo, Velella.
15 Squadron: Gondar, Neghelli, Ascianghi, Scirè.
16 Squadron: Micca, Foca
17 Squadron: H.1, H.2, H.4, H.6, H.8.
Total: twenty-seven submarines in seven squadrons (two more submarines were detached to operate in the Red Sea).
II Grupsom (Naples, C.F. Alberto Ginocchio)
21 Squadron: Marcello, Nani, Dandolo, Provana.
22 Squadron: Barbarigo, Emo, Morosini, Marconi, Da Vinci.
Total: nine submarines in two squadrons.
III Grupsom (Messina, C.F. Primo Longobardo)
31 Squadron: Pisani, Colonna, Bausan, Des Geneys.
33 Squadron: Bandiera, Manara, Menotti, Santarosa.
34 Squadron: Mameli, Capponi, Speri, Da Procida.
35 Squadron: Durbo, Tembien, Beilul.
37 Squadron: Bragadino, X.2, X.3.
Total: eighteen submarines divided into five squadrons based at Messina, Augusta, and Trapani (eight more submarines were on detached service to join V Grupsom Leros).
IV Grupsom (Taranto, C.F. Francesco Padolecchia)
40 Squadron: Balilla, Sciesa, Toti, Millelire.
41 Squadron: Liuzzi, Bagnolini, Giuliani, Tarantini.
42 Squadron: Brin.
43 Squadron: Settimo, Settembrini
44 Squadron: Anfitrite.
45 Squadron: Salpa, Serpente.
46 Squadron: Dessiè, Dagabur, Uarsciek, Uebi Scebeli.
47 Squadron: Malachite, Rubino, Ambra.
48 Squadron: Ondina.
49 Squadron: Atropo, Zoea, Corridoni.
Total: twenty-five submarines in ten squadrons, including two squadrons (eight submarines) based in Brindisi (Gruppo Sommergibili Brindisi, C.F. Teodorico Capone in June 1940), two squadrons (ten submarines) detached to Tobruk (VI Grupsom) and six more submarines detached for Red Sea service.
V Grupsom (Leros, C.F. A. Mirone)
51 Squadron: Narvalo, Squalo, Tricheco, Delfino.
52 Squadron: Jalea, Jantina, Ametista, Zaffiro.
Total: eight submarines in two squadrons which had been detached from III Grupsom (Messina).
VI Grupsom (Tobruk, C.F. U. Siviero)
61 Squadron: Sirena, Argonauta, Fisalia, Smeraldo, Naiade.
62 Squadron: Diamante, Topazio, Nereide, Galatea, Lafolè.
Total: ten submarines in two squadrons detached from IV Grupsom (Taranto).
VII Grupsom (Cagliari, C.F. Giovanni di Gropello)
71 Squadron: Alagi, Axum, Adua, Aradam.
72 Squadron: Diaspro, Corallo, Turchese, Medusa.
Total: eight submarines in two squadrons.
Submarine Flotilla in Red Sea (Massawa, C.C. C. Spagone) [Flottiglia Sommergibili in A.O.I. or Flottiglia Massaua]
81 Squadron: Guglielmotti, Ferraris, Galvani, Galileo Galilei.
2 Squadron: Perla, Macallè, Archimede, Torricelli.
There were eight submarines in two squadrons, six detached from IV Grupsom (Taranto), and two detached from I Grupsom (La Spezia).
Ligurian Sea
Italian Submarine Deployment on 11 June 1940
H.1 (Galeazzi) Between Gorgona Island and Cape Corso
H.4 (Albanese) Off Imperia
H.6 (Salvatori) Off Imperia
H.8 (Meneghini) Off Imperia
Iride (Brunetti) Off La Spezia, exercising
French Coast/Italian Riviera
Neghelli (Ferracuti) Cape d’Antibes/Toulon
Veniero (Buonamici) Toulon/St. Tropez
Gondar (Riccomini) Off Imperia
Fieramosca (Manca) Off Imperia
Mocenigo (Asnasch) Off San Remo
Medusa (Grossi) Off Ajaccio
Western Mediterranean
Dandolo (Boris) Off Cape Palos
Morosini (Criscuolo) Off Oran
Marcello (Donini) Off Cape Palos (turned back before 11 June because of defects)
Provana (Botti)* Off Oran
Faà di Bruno (Enrici) NW of Oran
Central Mediterranean
Barbarigo (Ghiglieri) Off Cape Bengut (east of Algiers)
Nani (Polizzi) Off Cape Bengut (east of Algiers)
Alagi (Nurra) Off Cape Zebib (Bizerta)
Adua (Roselli Lorenzini) Cape Teulada (patrol line)
Aradam (Bianchini) Cape Teulada (patrol line)
Axum (Gariazzo) Cape Teulada (patrol line)
Turchese (Miniero) Cape Teulada (patrol line)
Ascianghi (Gelli) Proceeding from La Maddalena to Cagliari
Bausan (Murzi) Sicilian Channel
Durbo (Acanfora) Gulf of Hammamet
Beilul (Vagliasindi) Between Pantelleria and Lampedusa
Brin (Sestini) Between Pantelleria and the Tunisian coast
Adriatic and Ionian Sea
Sciesa (Resio) Off Cattaro
Uarsciek (Zanchi) South of Cephalonia
Balilla (Morisani) South of Corfu
Anfitrite (Ghersina) Otranto Straits
Onice (Lovatelli) Proceeding from Taranto to Pola
Bagnolini (Tosoni Pittoni) Off Gavdo Island (patrol line)
Giuliani (Zelik) Off Gavdo Island (patrol line)
Salpa (Biondo) Off Gavdo Island (patrol line)
Tarantini (Iaschi) Off Gavdo Island (patrol line)
Aegean
Tricheco (Avogrado di Cerrione) Scarpanto
Delfino (Aicardi) Kaso Straits
Jalea (Cetti) Kaso Straits
Gemma (Cordero di Montezemolo) Off Chios
Zaffiro (Lombardi) Off Cape Prassoni
Settimo (Cantù) Kythera Channel
Uebi Scebeli (Zani) Cerigotto Channel
Velella (Terra) Between Rhodes and Turkish coast
Squalo (Migeca) Off Dardanelles
Ametista (Spigai) Doro Channel
Jantina (Politi) North-East of Cape Sidero
Libya and Egypt
Diamante (Parla)* Off Ras Azzaz, Libya (patrol line)
Lafolè (Barletta) Off Ras Azzaz, Libya (patrol line)
Nereide (Spano) Off Ras Azzaz, Libya (patrol line)
Topazio (Berengan) Off Ras Azzaz, Libya (patrol line)
Micca (Meneghini) Off Alexandria (minelaying)
Argonauta (Cavicchia Scalamonti) North of Alexandria
Fisalia (Acunto) North of Alexandria
Smeraldo (Carlo Todaro) North of Alexandria
Naiade (Baroni) Alexandria-Crete route
Galatea (Pilli) Alexandria-Crete route or east of Tobruk (early return because of defects).
Red Sea and Indian Ocean
Ferraris (Piomarta) Off Massawa
Macallè (Morone)* Off Port Sudan
Galileo Galilei (Nardi)* Off Aden
Galvani (Spano)* Proceeding to the Gulf of Oman
Atlantic
Finzi (Dominici) Off Canary Islands
Cappellini (Masi) Could not make the Gibraltar passage due to rudder defects and had to abort her mission and take refuge at Ceuta (Spanish Morocco).
[A third submarine, Glauco (Corvetti), was delayed by defects].
Reserve, repairs, etc.
Augusta
Bragadino (Bandini) Exercises/Trials
Pisani (Borghese) Exercises/Trials
X.2 (Iaccarino) Exercises/Trials
X.3 (Gatti) Exercises/Trials
Brindisi
Ondina (D’Amato) Exercises/Trials
Toti (Onnis) Available
Cagliari
Glauco (Corvetti) Exercises/Trials
Tazzoli (Raccanelli) Exercises/Trials
Fiume
Colonna (Bruzzone) Refitting
Des Geneys (Biagini) Refitting
Diaspro (Maresca) Exercises/Trials
La Spezia
Argo (Crepas) Refitting
Baracca (Bertarelli) Refitting
Berillo (Milesi Ferretti) Refitting
Bianchi (Carminati) Exercises/Trials
Calvi (Caridi) Refitting
Foca (Ciliberto) In the process of being adapted as a transport submarine
H.2 (Albanese1, responsible only) Refitting
Iride (Brunetti) Exercises/Trials
Torelli (Teppati) Refitting
Malaspina (Leoni) Refitting
Zoea (Bernabò) Available
Leros
Narvalo (Lucchesini) Refitting
Messina
Capponi (Romei) Exercises/Trials
Da Procida (D’Alterio) Exercises/Trials
Mameli (Maiorana) Exercises/Trials
Monfalcone
Corallo (Gatti) Refitting
Naples
Emo (Liannazza) Refitting
Da Vinci (Calda) Exercises/Trials
Marconi (Chialamberto) Exercises/Trials
Pola
Millelire (Girosi) Refitting
Otaria (Vocaturo) Refitting
Taranto
Ambra (Pini) Refitting
Atropo (Caneschi) Exercise/Trial period
Corridoni (Minucci) Refitting
Dagabur (Longanesi Cattani) Refitting
Dessié (Sestini) Refitting
Liuzzi (Bezzi) Exercises/Trials
Malachite (D’Elia) Exercises/Trials
Micca (Meneghini) Exercises/Trials
Rubino (Trebbi) Exercises/Trials
Serpente (Tognelli) Refitting
Settembrini (Bardi) Docked
Speri (Vannutelli) Refitting
Tobruk
Sirena (Galletti) Exercises/Trials
Trapani
Bandiera (Pelella) Exercises/Trials
Manara (Salvatore Todaro) Exercises/Trials
Menotti (Fecia di Cossato) Exercises/Trials
Santarosa (Notarbartolo di Villarosa) Exercises/Trials
Massawa
Archimede (Signorini) Exercises/Trials
Guglielmotti (Tucci) Exercises/Trials
Torricelli (Pelosi) Exercises/Trials
Perla (Pouchain) Refitting
*Submarine lost.
OPERATIONS
Mediterranean
Italian submarine patrols in the Mediterranean during June 1940
| Gemma (4-15 June) | Micca (5-20 June) | Velella (5-20 June) |
| Faà di Bruno (5-20 June) | Provana (5-17 June*) | Morosini (5-24 June) |
| Dandolo (5-17 June) | Marcello (5-10 June)x | Bagnolini (6-21 June) |
| Tarantini (6-16 June) | Settimo (6-16 June) | Salpa (6-16 June) |
| Giuliani (6-21 June) | Cappellini (6-14 June)x | Uebi Scebeli (6-15 June) |
| Barbarigo (6-15 June) | Nani (6-15 June) | Uarsciek (8-21 June) |
| Medusa (8-15 June) | Squalo (8-15 June) | Smeraldo (8-21 June) |
| Veniero (8-21 June) | Argonauta (9-22 June) | Fisalia (9-15 June) |
| Zaffiro (9-14 June) | Naiade (9-15 June) | Ametista (9-15 June) |
| Galatea (9-11 June)x | Neghelli (9-21 June) | Delfino (9-14 June) |
| Jalea (9-14 June) | Jantina (9-20 June) | Balilla (9-13 June)x |
| Tricheco (9-14 June) | Gondar (9-14 June) | Durbo (9-19 June) |
| Mocenigo (9-14 June) | Fieramosca (9-14 June) | Brin (9-15 June) |
| Beilul (9-19 June) | Topazio (9-14 June) | Nereide (9-14 June) |
| Alagi (9-20 June) | Sciesa (9-16 June) | Aradam (9-14 June) |
| Adua (9-21 June) | Lafolè (9-20 June) | Diamante (9-20 June*) |
| Axum (9-20 June) | Turchese (9-21 June) | H.6 (9-14 June) |
| Anfitrite (9-16 June) | H.8 (9-13 June) | H.4 (9-14 June) |
| H.1 (9-13 June) | Bausan (11-13 June) | Iride (14-19 June) |
| Scirè (14-19 June) | Liuzzi (16-27 June*) | Toti (16-30 June) |
| Rubino (17-29 June*) | Bandiera (17 June…) | Pisani (17-23 June) |
| Mocenigo (17-29 June) | Capponi (17-26 June) | Malachite (17 June…) |
| Ascianghi (17-30 June) | Tricheco (18-24 June) | Brin (18-28 June) |
| Bausan (18-26 June) | Zoea (18-21 June) Pt.1 | Menotti (18-30 June) |
| Manara (18-30 June) | Sirena (18-22 June) | Squalo (19-26 June) |
| Delfino (19-26 June) | H.8 (19-24 June) | H.1 (19-25 June) |
| Aradam (20-28 June) | Iride (20-28 June) | Settembrini (20-21 June) |
| Uebi Scebeli (20-21 June) | Fieramosca (20-25 June)x | Santarosa (21-26 June) |
| Glauco (21-28 June) | Nani (21-28 June) | Tazzoli (21-28 June) |
| Atropo (22-26 June) | H.4 (22-25 June) | Gondar (22-25 June) |
| Medusa (22-24 June) | Marcello (22-24 June) | Zoea (22-24 June) Pt.2 |
| Bragadino (24-28 June) Pt.1 | Beilul (24-27 June) | Da Procida (25 June…) |
| Tembien (25 June…) | Anfitrite (27-30 June)x | Ondina (27 June…) |
| Marconi (27 June…) | Emo (27 June…) | Uebi Scebeli (27-29 June*) |
| Salpa (27 June…) | Barbarigo (27 June…) | Dandolo (27 June…) |
| Tarantini (27 June…) | Argonauta (27-29 June?*) | H.8 (27 June…) |
| Gemma (28 June…) | Topazio (28 June…) | Jalea (29 June…) |
| Ametista (29 June…) | Zaffiro (29 June…) | Bragadino (29 June…) Pt.2 |
| Jantina (29 June…) | Zoea (29 June…) | Corridoni (29 June…) Pt.1 |
The list is in chronological order of departure.
(17 June…) indicates that the patrol finished in the following month.
(…17 June) indicates a patrol started in the previous month.
(…) indicates a patrol that started in the preceding month and completed in the following month.
An asterisk (*) indicates that the submarine was lost on that date (or an approximate date).
“x” indicates that the patrol was interrupted due to defects or other causes.
Pt.1 indicates an outgoing supply trip.
Pt.2 indicates the return trip unless the submarine made several stops, in which case it may indicate Pt.1a, Pt.1b or Pt2a, Pt.2b, etc.
On 4 June, Italian submarines began to leave port to take up their stations. Marcello (C.C. Luigi Donini) was on her way to join a patrol line near Cape Palos when the crew was overcome by fumes of methyl chloride from the air conditioning system. The submarine had to turn back. Seven crew members were hospitalised in Cagliari, and one of them, Sergente silurista (torpedoman’s mate) Adriano D’Andrea, died. He was the first victim of the submarine war. It is hard to understand why the problem of methyl chloride was not solved earlier as Italian submarines had already been plagued by it during the Spanish Civil War.
As the submarines were nearing their station, Uebi Scebeli (T.V. Bruno Zani) observed the cruiser Helle near Cerigotto, but she was neutral and could not be attacked. Two months later, the Greek warship was not so fortunate. Minutes before midnight on 10 June, Barbarigo (C.C. Giulio Ghiglieri) was nearly rammed by a destroyer off Algiers, but its identity has not been determined.
The first attack by an Italian submarine occurred at 0100 hours on 11 June, when the Smeraldo (T.V. Carlo Todaro2), operating sixty miles west of Alexandria, missed an unidentified steamer of about 7-8,000 tons with a small escort vessel on a westerly course. This was a snap attack at a range of fewer than 1,000 meters with a single torpedo fired from a stern tube in the heavy seas (Force 4). The torpedo missed3. Nearly three hours later, an H-class destroyer was observed returning to Alexandria, and Todaro assumed it was the warship which had escorted out the steamer. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, led by HMS Hyperion (D.2) with Hero, Havock, Hostile, Imperial, Decoy, Defender, and HMAS Waterhen had sailed from Alexandria to clear the approaches of Italian submarines as far as 25°40’ E, and the warship seen by Smeraldo was most likely one of them.
HMS Decoy carried out the first anti-submarine attack of the war with Italy. A submarine was observed on the surface at 2245 hours on 10 June4, about 50 miles from Ras Azzaz (Libya), right at the limit of her antisubmarine sweep instructions. The range was only 300 yards, and the destroyer attempted to ram but, despite the sharp turn, missed the conning tower by 30 yards. The submarine submerged stern first as one 4in round was fired from the “B” gun, but the close range (100 yards) meant that the gun could not be depressed enough. One depth charge was dropped, and a flare was used to mark the position of the submarine, followed shortly after by a pattern of four depth charges. A strong smell of oil was detected. It is likely that the submarine was Diamante (T.V. Angelo Parla) as the position was very close to her patrol area. We have no confirmation from the Italian side as she was sunk by HMS Parthian while returning to Tobruk, but if indeed she was the submarine attacked by Decoy, she suffered little damage as she maintained her patrol for ten more days.
At 0630 hours on 11 June, the French submarine Le Vengeur (Lieutenant de vaisseau Henri Jean-Marie Digard) was on a defensive patrol near Cani Rocks when a periscope was sighted three times. The alarm was immediately given. This was probably the Italian submarine Alagi (C.C. Stefano Nurra) patrolling off Cape Zebib on this day. The torpedo boats Alcyon, La Bombarde, and L’Iphigénie were sent to hunt and dropped thirty-two depth charges, but the Italian submarine reported only distant explosions.
Early the same morning, Jalea (T.V. Sandro Cetti), on patrol in the Kaso Straits, claimed to have been depth charged, but there was no evidence that this was the case. Shortly later, Barbarigo (C.C. Giulio Ghiglieri) was bombed off Cape Bengut by an aircraft, probably French. Nani (C.C. Gioacchino Polizzi) heard this in the adjacent area. At Malta, the British armed trawler Diamond claimed to have sunk an Italian submarine in position 092° – St Elmo Light – 9 miles, but the attack was bogus.
Forming a barrage line with Bagnolini, Giuliani, and Salpa, Tarantini (C.C. Alfredo Iaschi) was about 75 miles southeast of Gavdo Island (Crete) when, in the evening of the 11th, she missed an eastbound tanker because of a torpedo malfunction. The target has not been positively identified but may have been the petrol tanker Pass of Balmaha, who had left Gibraltar for Alexandria. Iaschi was admonished for having failed to persevere in the attack. Three days later, Iaschi claimed to have been missed by a submarine, but none operated in the area, and the two torpedo tracks were probably porpoises, a common error made by all protagonists.
Sinking of the light cruiser HMS Calypso
After midnight on 12 June, about 60 miles south of Gavdo Island, having recharged her batteries, Bagnolini (T.V. Franco Tosoni Pittoni) was cruising on the surface. At 0050 hours, in the waning moon and with a visibility of about 4,000 metres, a dark shape was observed forward to starboard. Six minutes later, two small cruisers of the Caledon class were observed crossing the bow of the submarine. Their speed was estimated at 20 knots, and at 0058 hours, and from 1,500 metres, Bagnolini fired a single torpedo from a bow tube angled at 30 degrees. A second torpedo was about to be fired when a column of water about 50-60 metres tall was observed between the first funnel and the bridge. Tosoni Pittoni decided to take his submarine down to escape the expected counterattack from the escorts but it failed to materialise. The target was the light cruiser Calypso (Captain H.A. Rowley, RN), and the torpedo hit forward of ‘A’ boiler room on the starboard side. The ship took an immediate list but took an hour and a half to sink. Of her crew, thirty-seven were killed or drowned; the survivors were picked up by the light cruiser HMS Caledon and the destroyer HMS Dainty. This was the first major success of Italian submarines in this war, and much would be made that only one torpedo was needed to achieve it. In the Royal Navy, this attack raised concern as the submarine was not detected by the ASDIC screen. A board of enquiry was held on board the battleship HMS Royal Sovereign on 15 June5. Tosoni Pittoni did not realise that the main body of the Mediterranean Fleet led by HMS Warspite was only a few miles to the east6. He was immediately promoted to Capitano di corvetta and, the following month, was decorated with the Medaglia d’Argento (Silver Medal). In 1941, he was posthumously awarded the Medaglia d’Oro al Valore Militare (Gold Medal for Valour) for this action.
Early in the morning of 12 June, near Cape Santa Maria di Leuca, Balilla (C.C. Michele Morisani) reported being shaken by an explosion and aborted her patrol. No Italian or Allied aircraft had reported any action, but Morisani was showing signs of stress and, a few weeks later, was relieved of his command. As in most navies of the Second World War, a number of submarine commanders who performed well in peacetime failed to pass the test in time of war and were transferred to other duties.
In the eastern Mediterranean, submarines of the Tobruk-based 62 Squadron consisting of Lafolè, Diamante, Topazio, and Nereide formed a barrage 20 miles apart, on a line 30 degrees and starting 30 miles from Ras Azzaz. At dawn on 12 June, Nereide (T.V. Mario Spano), was cruising some 85 miles north of Sidi Barrani. She was just coming to periscope depth to listen to the radio when the executive officer discovered a large tanker estimated at 12-15,000 tons, steering 130 degrees at about 5 knots. Spano was quickly summoned to the control room. The submarine was on an opposite course, and the range was diminishing rapidly. The Italian commander lost no time in ordering a torpedo fired from a bow tube as the submarine turned sharply to starboard. The range was estimated at only 500 meters, and upon firing, Nereide was taken to a depth of 12 meters. This proved to be an error as, though a loud explosion was heard when the submarine came back to periscope depth, the target could only be observed disappearing in the low visibility with dense smoke coming out of her funnel. Spano failed to report the encounter as this was not in his war instructions.
The target was the Norwegian tanker Orkanger (8,030 GRT, built 1928) trying to reach Alexandria. She had sailed from Port Said for Malta carrying 10,500 tons of fuel, and the declaration of war forced her to turn back. She had not been hit, but her troubles were not over. Two more submarines based in Tobruk had been ordered to cover the western approaches to Alexandria; these were Galatea (C.C. Bruno Pilli) and Naiade (T.V. Luigi Baroni). The former had to turn back on 10 June after being hunted and depth charged by five destroyers, but the latter was now poised exactly on the route of the tanker. During the afternoon, Naiade, now about 60 miles from Alexandria, had discovered a convoy formed by a large tug towing three pontoons and three smaller tugs escorted by a gunboat. The submarine had surfaced with the intention of disposing of the gunboat before taking care of the other vessels, but her gun misfired due to wet ammunition and the attack was broken off before the gunboat opened fire with her main guns. The submarine submerged under machine gun fire but escaped without damage. The identity of this convoy has not been established, and Admiral Cunningham’s war diaries do not mention the incident. At 1900 hours, Naiade surfaced, and nearly two hours later, the Norwegian tanker was seen proceeding at 13 knots toward Alexandria. The submarine interrupted the charging of batteries and raced on the surface to intercept, firing a torpedo from a range of 1,200 metres. It hit the target squarely, but although a lifeboat was seen to have been launched, Orkanger was still struggling to move away. Baroni decided to finish her off with a stern shot; this time, the 450mm torpedo had an irregular course and missed. Finally, a second bow shot sent her to the bottom. Four crew members had been killed, and the thirty-nine survivors, including ten passengers, were picked up by the Spanish freighter Tom and brought to Alexandria. This was an important success and an early blow to British efforts to supply Malta.
In the early hours of 12 June, thirty-two Blenheim bombers of No. 202 Group initiated the first air raid on Tobruk in conjunction with a naval bombardment. The submarines Galatea, who had just returned from her aborted patrol, and Sirena (T.V. Raul Galletti), immobilised because of defects, were near-missed by bombs. The former was slightly damaged by fragments, and one midshipman was wounded. During the same attack, the gunboat Berta was sunk by shelling, and other vessels were damaged.
The first mine-laying mission was carried out by Micca (C.F. Vittorio Meneghini) on 12 June in deep waters northwest of Alexandria. To the enthusiastic cries of “Viva il Re” and “Saluto al Duce,” the first of forty mines was launched. Meneghini, who had just celebrated his 40th birthday the previous day, would be awarded the Medaglia d’Argento for this action. His age also meant that his career as a submariner would be terminated the following month, and he would be affected to other duties. The same evening the minefield was discovered by the destroyer HMAS Stuart. Some of the mines were cleared by the minesweepers Abingdon and Bagshot of the Second Minesweeping Flotilla. It is possible that one of these mines survived the minesweeping efforts and detonated in the wake of the destroyer HMS Janus on 4 June 1942, causing damages that required three weeks of repairs. Yet the apparent failure of this mission would reap an unexpected benefit for the Italian Navy. Mines recovered showed that they could be laid in much deeper waters than British mines; the first mine was laid at a depth of 299 metres. This was a great surprise, and British warships were now instructed not to enter Italian waters in depths less than 200 fathoms (365m) unless special permission was given or the circumstances and risks warranted it. This would restrict British submarine activities in Italian coastal waters well into 1941. Later, ‘Shrimp’ Simpson, the fiery commander of Malta submarines, was inclined to disregard these orders as he concluded, with a certain justification, that mines laid in such deep waters could not be very effective. In fact, the longer but necessarily thinner cables of these mines would result in many breaking away from their moorings, especially during the winter months, with the result that navigation would be imperiled for friends and foes alike.
Most Italian submarines deployed off the Italian Riviera would return to La Spezia on the morning of 14 June, thus missing an opportunity to intercept the French cruiser squadron on its way to bombard Vado. The only exceptions were Neghelli (C.C. Carlo Ferracuti) and Veniero (C.C. Folco Buonamici), who were still on patrol south of the Hyères Islands.
On 13 June, before dawn, Neghelli missed a merchant vessel on its way to Marseille. The same afternoon, south of Nice, she was at a depth of 27 metres on hydrophone watch when she was suddenly attacked by the French destroyers La Bayonnaise and La Baliste escorting the 15th Submarine Division (Vénus, Pallas, Iris, and Archimède). They were on their way to participate in Operation VADO. Neghelli had not detected the enemy warships approaching. A few hours later, it was Veniero’s turn to discover a submarine of the Sirène class proceeding eastward, but she was unable to close. This was probably Vénus or Pallas, but their patrol reports have not survived, so we are unable to confirm it. Again, the Italian submarine had failed to detect it with its hydrophones. The clear waters of the Mediterranean had induced Italian submariners to excessive reliance on their listening apparatus rather than periscope observation. Their noisy submarines, as well as a lack of suitably trained hydrophone operators, made this difficult. This did not mean that complaints were universal. After his first patrol, T.V. Bruno Zani of Uebi Scebeli, declared himself satisfied with the functioning of his hydrophones and had high praises for the operator Sergente R.T.I. Pasquale Poliseno. Yet two weeks later, his submarine was lost.
In the early hours of the morning of 13 June, about 45 miles southeast of Palos, Dandolo (C.C. Riccardo Boris) detected a French cruiser squadron and fired two torpedoes at the rear ship; she missed. These were the light cruisers La Galissonnière, Jean de Vienne, and Marseillaise, escorted by the destroyers Le Brestois and Le Boulonnais. The cruisers launched two float planes to scout, and they reported the approaching torpedoes. One was seen crossing between La Galissonnière and Jean de Vienne, missing the latter by twenty metres ahead. A float plane from Jean de Vienne had spotted the submarine, however it was not armed with bombs. Another aircraft from La Galissonnière followed up and, this time dropped a bomb. Dandolo had just reached a depth of 20 metres when she was badly shaken by the explosion. La Galissonnière ineffectually dropped twelve depth charges, and the escorts were ordered to hunt the submarine while the cruisers continued. Each destroyer dropped three depth charges; the submarine had now reached a depth of 118 metres and escaped from her tormentors. About half an hour later, the destroyer Typhon, who was escorting the battleship Provence, observed bubbles and dropped six depth charges, but they were distant from the submarine. It was certain that the economy displayed by Italian commanders in the number of torpedoes expended had been detrimental to their success. Boris ought to have fired a full salvo of torpedoes, and his failure to do so may have robbed him of at least a torpedo hit. At about the same time, but northeast of Algiers, Faà di Bruno (C.C. Aldo Enrici) was depth charged and also reported diving to 118 metres. Three days later, through cumulative defects, she abandoned her patrol, and Enrici, perhaps unjustly, would be criticised for lack of aggressiveness. A few months later, he would disappear with his boat.
The Aegean sector was relatively quiet. On the evening of 13 June, Settimo (T.V. Giovanni Cantù) was cruising off Suda (Crete) when a large submarine was observed moving slowly. This was most probably HMS Phoenix operating in the area and recharging her batteries. Cantù had taken command of his submarine only the day before his departure; he wasted no time in attacking. Two bow tubes had been kept loaded and angled at 30 degrees to the right and 30 degrees to the left. As the submarine closed the range to about 1,000 metres, the angle of the starboard torpedo was reduced to 20 degrees, and the Italian commander intended to fire this torpedo and reserved the second torpedo for a shorter range. The first torpedo left the tube, but due to a misunderstanding, the second one was also fired. Both missed. Cantù claimed that the enemy submarine fired back a torpedo angled at about 70 degrees, and, having no other torpedoes to fire, he was forced to disengage by going deep. British submarines usually fired only straight ahead and could only angle torpedoes at 90 degrees. In fact, Phoenix did not fire a torpedo, nor does it appear to have observed the attack.
The same afternoon, Brin (C.C. Fausto Sestini) was patrolling west of Pantelleria, when two torpedo boats of the Altair-class were sighted. Sestini prudently took his submarine deep. These were Antares and Aldebaran on a mission to destroy the derelict wreck of the Greek steamer Makis, who had been mined. The two Italian torpedo boats were not informed of the presence of the submarine. They got a hydrophone contact and dropped depth charges. Curiously, though the hunt was described in the submarine report, there was no mention of the depth charging.
On 13 June, while returning to Augusta, Bausan (C.C. Francesco Murzi) was missed by torpedoes. They may have been fired from HMS Grampus, who disappeared with all hands on her first war patrol.
In the early hours of 14 June, Gondar (T.V. Piero Riccomini), withdrawing from patrol, was off Cape Mele (Andora) when she came under an air attack carried out by four Chance Vought V-156FS (No.1, 5, 7, and 9) of the French AB 3 Squadron. The low cloud cover prevented the submarine from diving in time, and only one aircraft was seen. They dropped a total of five bombs. However, the submarine escaped damage. The aircraft were covering the French Squadron bombarding Vado. An hour later, the submarine was depth charged by an unknown warship and escaped by going down to 70 metres. The French force consisted of four heavy cruisers, Algérie (flagship of Admiral Duplat), Colbert, Dupleix, and Foch, and eleven destroyers. A coastal battery scored a direct hit, which killed twelve men on the French destroyer Albatros, but the other warships escaped unscathed. The raiding force was engaged by the torpedo boat Calatafimi, but her claim to have torpedoed two large French destroyers and sank one of them was not substantiated.
At 0143 hours on 15 June, southeast of Palos, Morosini (C.C. Alfredo Criscuolo) fired a single torpedo at a French destroyer, but due to an error in drill, the torpedo was not angled as intended and missed.
The same day, HMS Rorqual, on a mine-laying mission near Brindisi, missed Anfitrite (T.V. Brunone Ghersina) with three torpedoes. The Italian submarine dived upon sighting his attacker but lost contact before being able to reply.
Durbo (T.V. Armando Acanfora) was on patrol southwest of Pantelleria when, at 0610 hours on 16 June, she observed a French destroyer of the Aigle-class. Two torpedoes were fired, and an explosion was heard. Later, Durbo was attributed –wrongly– the loss of the French Morse, following the Armistice when the French Admiralty made enquiries to solve the mystery of her disappearance. Scanfora was awarded the Medaglia d’Argento. This submarine was lost on a defensive minefield off Tunisia, and her wreck was located by a French aircraft in August of this year.
Loss of Provana
During the afternoon of 16 June7, 80 miles north of Oran, a submarine believed to be Provana (C.C. Ugo Botti) fired two torpedoes at convoy IR2F proceeding from Algeria to Marseille. It consisted of the troop transports Florida, Kita, Edéa, Medie II, and Djebel Aurès escorted by the sloops Commandant Bory and La Curieuse. La Curieuse (Capitaine de corvette Le Blanc) manoeuvred to avoid the tracks and dropped a pattern of depth charges, and Commandant Bory (Capitaine de corvette Leblanc8) followed up with another pattern. From the bridge of La Curieuse a periscope was spotted and shortly after a submarine was seen attempting to surface. The French vessel rammed her at full speed. The sloop was smaller than the submarine, and after the collision, she embarked on 150 tons of water. The crew was about to abandon the ship, but the damage was brought under control, and she limped away at 8 knots. She reached Oran the next morning. The collision had been fatal to the submarine; eight officers and fifty-four ratings went down with her. She was the first Italian submarine lost in the Mediterranean. Despite several claims of U-boat sinking during the 1939-1940 campaign, Provana would be the only submarine sunk by the French Navy. Following the French Armistice, details of the action were revealed, and Capitano di corvetta Ugo Botti would be the first submariner of the Second World War to be awarded the Medaglia d’Oro. The Italian Naval High Command was still clinging to hopes that survivors may have been picked up and were prisoners of war. Discreet enquiries were made as late as September 1940 through their Legation in Roumania, but hopes were finally dashed when the British answered in the negative.
During the night of 16/17 Adua (T.V. Giuseppe Roselli Lorenzini) was cruising between Mallorca and Ibiza when an enemy destroyer was observed. Visibility was excellent, but the range of about 4,000 metres made a surface attack difficult, and the submarine prudently submerged. For the next couple of hours, hydrophones revealed what appeared to be two enemy units hunting the submarine. The motors were stopped, and Adua used her Rovetto apparatus to remain motionless at a depth of 30 metres. At daylight, hydrophone noises were no longer heard; the submarine had just returned to periscope depth when a French convoy was seen. This was convoy IR2F consisting of the transports Florida, Kita, Edéa, Medie II, and Djebel Aurès escorted by the sloop Commandant Bory, the very same that had been attacked by Provana the previous afternoon. Only one torpedo was fired. and it missed, although Lorenzini claimed to have hit a large freighter. Again, the reluctance to fire a torpedo salvo at an important convoy yielded no result.
Twenty miles east of Augusta, on her second patrol of the month, Brin (this time under T.V. Luigi Longanesi Cattani) reported being missed by a torpedo on 18 June. If this was true, then HMS Grampus may have survived the attack by the torpedo boats Circe and Clio, who supposedly disposed of her on 16 June. It was not rare for sailors to mistake a porpoise for a torpedo, and these ‘attacks’ must be treated with caution.
Loss of Diamante
Early in the afternoon of 19 June, the submarine HMS Parthian (Lt Cdr M.G. Rimington, RN) attempted to torpedo the armed cruiser San Giorgio. The warship was protected by nets at her anchorage in Tobruk. Two torpedoes fired from long range missed, one hitting the wreck of the gunboat Berta, victim of an air attack on 13 June. Following the attack, Rimington took his submarine eastward to clear the area from the expected hunt that was to follow. The destroyer Turbine was indeed ordered out and searched for the submarine, haphazardly dropping all her depth charges. She had to borrow depth charges from her immobilised consort Euro and sailed again, this time joined by the destroyer Nembo and assisted by a seaplane, but nothing was seen. At 0145 hours, Rimington received orders to shift his patrol area to Derna. Shortly after, a signal from Admiral Cunningham informed him that an Italian submarine was returning to Tobruk and was expected during the night at Sidi Abeida (about 15 miles west of Tobruk) to be escorted in. The British commander felt that the signal had arrived too late for him to act upon; he was now over thirty miles from this location, and the Italian submarine had probably already reached Tobruk. Nevertheless, he turned his submarine to westward to conform with his instructions to proceed to Derna.
Admiral Cunningham had received a signal from the Admiralty stating a decrypt had revealed the expected arrival of the submarine Lafolè at 2400/199 at Sidi Abeida and her request that a pilot vessel meet her. This was quickly relayed to the British submarine. The signal was itself intercepted by the German B-Dienst; no doubt they drew the proper conclusions and probably informed their Italian colleagues that their signals were being read by the British. This would play in the decision by the Italians to change their ciphers the next month—to the great chagrin of British Intelligence.
In the meantime, the failed attack on San Giorgio had unexpected consequences. Both Lafolè and Diamante had been expected at Sidi Abeida (about 15 miles west of Tobruk). Diamante (T.V. Angelo Parla) had made a signal timed 1930/19 that she expected to make landfall there at 0500 hours the next day. Maricosom, informed of the presence of an enemy submarine off Tobruk, now countermanded the order and told the submarines to remain 20 miles off the coast until further notice. It was only on the morning of 20 June that the order came that they could resume their course to Sidi Abeida as originally ordered and on the surface.
By this time, Parthian was passing through this area, 30 miles off the coast, when a Perla-class submarine was observed proceeding on the surface. Rimington now took his boat on a parallel course, closing the range to 400 yards. At 1502 hours, four torpedoes were fired, and all were claimed hits as the target disintegrated. This was Diamante, and it was her bad luck that she was returning to Tobruk from the west, a route judged safer than the obvious one from the east. Why was she still so far from her destination? The unfortunate submarine took this mystery to her grave. There were no survivors; Parla and his crew of five officers and thirty-seven ratings perished. Lafolè was luckier; she received the recall signal at 1100 hours and was met by the destroyer Nembo and escorted in. This was the first success of British submarines in the Mediterranean. Italian submarines had orders to travel on the surface in Italian-controlled waters as the Regia Aeronautica had been instructed to attack only submerged submarines. It would explain the success of British submarines in their encounters with their Italian counterparts. British submarines were also allowed to fire a full salvo at an enemy submarine, the same as a major warship. By contrast, in twenty-four encounters with enemy submarines, Italian submarines would fire only a single torpedo eighteen times and the remainder six only two torpedoes.
Morosini (C.C. Alfredo Criscuolo) now occupied the position vacated by Provana following her loss. On 21 June, off Cape Palos, she fired a single torpedo at an unescorted merchantman; a loud explosion was heard after fifty-six seconds, but success was not confirmed.
On the same day, before noon, Malachite (C.C. Renato d’Elia) was patrolling east of Minorca when a formation of twelve aircraft was sighted on a southerly course. This was the French T 2 Squadron (Laté.29-8 seaplanes) evacuating from Berre to Bougie (Algeria), and five aircraft peeled off to attack the submarine. The submarine dived and, as she reached a depth of forty-four metres, was shaken by an explosion but escaped with only minor damage. Only two aircraft had completed the attack (piloted respectively by Enseigne de vaisseau Grosclaude and Maître LeGall); the others dropped bombs that failed to explode.
A few hours later, off La Spezia, the old Canadian-built H.8 (T.V. Teucle Meneghini) also reported an air attack but came out unscathed. That evening, Fratelli Bandiera (T.V. Maria Renato Pelella), patrolling off Cape Palos (Spain), fired a single torpedo at an unidentified steamer; it missed.
On 21 June, Turchese (C.C. Gustavo Miniero), having spent a fruitless patrol, was on her way back when a seaplane in difficulty was seen to have alighted. This was Cant Z.501 no.3 of 146^ Squadriglia. The submarine picked up the four crew members and towed the seaplane to Cagliari.
After midnight, Ascianghi (T.V. Ugo Gelli), cruising near the Balearic Islands, sighted a vessel that was mistaken for a 15,000-ton transport and fired four torpedoes singly, but they all missed. This was the British Ashcrest (5,645 GRT, built 1920). It was the only recorded attack in 1940 for which an Italian submarine emptied all its forward tubes. The submarine attempted to sink the vessel by gunfire but was thwarted by the heavy seas, and the target vanished in the darkness.
Almost at the same time, Pier Capponi (T.V. Romeo Romei) was patrolling on the surface between Pantelleria and Cape Bon when a shadow was observed ahead. Romei ordered the diesels shut down and, with the submarine half submerged, closed in using the electric motors at full speed. A large ship proceeding at about 10 knots could be made out, and the Italian captain intended to fire a torpedo from about 1,000 metres when the target suddenly turned away and increased speed to 12 knots. This was the Swedish Elgo (1,888 GRT, built 1918), carrying general cargo from Tunis to Sfax, and the old ship was now desperately trying to escape. The submarine now surfaced completely; her diesels were now making 13 knots and maintaining the distance. Speed was further increased to 15 knots, and she managed to gain sufficiently enough to get into an attacking position. At 0132 hours, Capponi fired a torpedo from 1,000 metres, but in the moonlight, the phosphorescent wake must have been spotted, and it was avoided. She now opened fire with her deck gun, scoring many hits. A second torpedo missed under; the submarine attempted a stern shot, and although a hit was claimed, this was not confirmed by the survivors. Finally, a new bow shot, this time using a 450mm torpedo, hit and sent her to the bottom. One life was lost, and three were wounded.
The same afternoon, patrolling between Majorca and Algeria, Enrico Tazzoli (C.C. Vittore Raccanelli) was attacked in error by a Cant Z.506 seaplane. The submarine was missed by only five metres, but fortunately, the bomb failed to explode.
As the war with France drew to an end, a second wave of submarines was sent to operate against French traffic. On 21 June. a patrol line in the Gulf of Lion was formed with Iride, Aradam, Mocenigo, Malachite, and Fieramosca. At about the same time, another group consisting of Bandiera, Ascianghi, Santarosa, and Nani was ordered to operate off Cape Palos and Minorca. A third group sailed to operate off Algeria (Tazzoli, Glauco, Toti, Marcello, and Medusa) and another near Malta and the Sicilian Channel (Capponi, Pisani, and Da Procida).
On 23 June, Iride (T.V. Francesco Brunetti), some 45 miles southwest of Marseille, missed at short range a large armed ship proceeding to this port with two torpedoes fired singly; the first one had an erratic course. The vessel turned and attempted to ram the submarine, which escaped by diving to eighty metres. Five explosions followed, and by the time the submarine had returned to periscope depth, the enemy vessel was gone.
The venerable Ettore Fieramosca (C.C. Peppino Manca), on her second patrol off the French coast, had a battery explosion as she surfaced off Hyeres on the evening of 24 June. She was forced to abort her mission, and her operational career was over. She would be relegated to training duty before being disarmed in April 1941.
During the war, Italian submarines were often used in a transport role. Bragadino (C.C. Bandino Bandini) initiated this type of mission by bringing supplies for the Regia Aeronautica at Tobruk. On 25 June, she was fired upon by the patrol vessel Marongiu (A.S.3), unaware of the ordinance that surfaced submarines in Italian waters should not be attacked. Luckily, Bragadino was undamaged.
The same day, the French Armistice came into effect. This altered the balance of power in the Mediterranean, as the French Fleet had assumed a preponderant role, and now Great Britain’s position appeared precarious. During the night, east of Cefalù (north coast of Sicily), Pier Capponi (T.V. Romeo Romei) fired a stern shot at an unidentified vessel (subsequently believed to have been a submarine, but none were in the vicinity); it missed. This was fortunate as the vessel was most likely an Italian fishing vessel.
The French submarine Achéron (C.C. Alliou) was not out of the war yet. On 26 June, returning to Beirut, she was sighted about 10 miles southwest of Levitha (Aegean) by Atropo (C.F. Luigi Caneschi) on a supply mission to Leros. The Italian submarine fired two torpedoes but missed. Having no more torpedoes loaded in the forward tubes, she had to escape retaliatory action by diving.
The same day, the British Baron Erskine (3,657 GRT, built 1930) and Baron Newlands (3,628 GRT, built 1930) were travelling to Gibraltar when they were located by Glauco (C.F. Candido Corvetti). They had been on passage from Oran to Bizerte when they were recalled due to the change in the war situation. Baron Erskine was slightly damaged by a round fired from Glauco and replied with her gun, claiming a hit on the submarine, but this was not the case. After two torpedoes missed them, both vessels managed to outrun their pursuer.
The same evening, the British Cydonia was missed by a torpedo near Cape de Gata [see the Atlantic section further on].
Force C, consisting of five destroyers led by HMS Dainty (Commander M.S. Thomas) with Defender, Decoy, Ilex, and HMAS Voyager, was ordered to make an anti-submarine sweep of the Antikythera Channel and sailed from Alexandria at 0600 hours on 27 June. They were covering the passage of fast convoy MA.3. The sweep was to be maintained until 2200 hours on the 28th when they were to go to Malta, but fortune would smile at them before that.
Loss of Console Generale Liuzzi
At dusk on 27 June, Console Generale Liuzzi (C.C. Lorenzo Bezzi) was having trouble with a leaky diesel oil pump and proceeding on the surface, some 200 miles northwest of Alexandria. At 1830 hours, Leading Signalman Edge on the bridge of HMS Dainty sighted her at a distance of six miles, bearing straight ahead. The destroyer increased speed and made a challenge as it could have been the French Protée returning from patrol10. The submarine submerged without answering, and the destroyer rushed to drop a pattern of depth charges. HMS Ilex, Decoy, and Defender joined the hunt, the noise made by the old HMAS Voyager disturbed the Asdic operators and she was ordered away. Fighting for survival, the submarine attempted to escape by going down to an estimated 170-180 metres—the depth-gauge jammed—but was soon forced to the surface. The heavy seas prevented accurate gunfire, and Dainty finally dropped one last depth charge as she crossed the path of the disabled submarine and finished her off. Ten were killed or drowned, including Bezzi, who would be awarded the Medaglia d’Oro; fifty-one survivors were picked up. They had dropped all confidential papers in the water, but they floated away, and all were reported to have been picked up by boats lowered from the destroyers.
From these papers, the British discovered the positions of four other submarines on a patrol line between Derna and the island of Gavdo, which were spread thirty miles apart. The submarines belonged to different squadrons from the Taranto-based IV Grupsom:
Ondina: 34°16′ N, 23°24′ E.
Anfitrite: 34°43′ N, 23°40′ E.
Salpa: 33°46′ N, 23°10′ E.
Uebi Scebeli: 33°16′ N, 22°56′ E.
Force C was now ordered to sweep and dispose of them. The anti-submarine search of the Antikythera Channel was called off. Sunderland aircraft would assist them in the search11.
The RAF had already begun to assert itself as a serious threat to Italian submarines. Southwest of Zante, at 1136 hours on 28 June Anfitrite (T.V. Brunone Ghersina) was sighted by Sunderland ‘Q’ (L.5806) of 228 Squadron piloted by Wing Commander G.E. Nicholetts; it dropped three bombs but caused no damage. Less than three hours later, the submarine was attacked from the stern by Sunderland ‘S’ (L.5804) of 230 Squadron. Flight Lt W.W. Campbell took his aircraft in a dive from 5,000 feet and dropped two anti-submarine bombs. The submarine dived at once but had its two periscopes damaged and was forced to return to base. Ondina (T.V. Vincenzo d’Amato) had witnessed the attack from a distance and, assuming she was the target, had also submerged.
The next day, at 0635 hours, Sirena was attacked by a Sunderland and claimed to have shot it down. For this action, T.V. Galletti was awarded the Medaglia d’Argento. However, the aircraft was undamaged, this was again Nicholetts with Q/228, and he had released four bombs from a very low altitude (50 metres, according to eye-witnesses), but they failed to arm and did not explode. Two bombs were dropped in a second run, however, the submarine had already escaped and her anti-aircraft fire had been described as ineffective. Sirena, proceeding underwater in the vicinity, heard the bomb and assumed that she was the target.
Force C was now proceeding to Malta. HMAS Voyager was probably the destroyer attacked at 0503 hours on 29 June by Tarantini (C.C. Alfredo Iaschi) with a torpedo in position 35°21′ N, 20°24′ E or about 120 miles southwest of Cape Matapan. This appears to be a focal point for Italian submarines transiting to and from their patrol areas and may have been revealed by the Liuzzi papers, although this has not been disclosed. Two of them, perhaps three, were in the immediate area. Tarantini reported being counter-attacked with thirty-four depth charges but avoided damage. Two successive attacks with a single torpedo at her tormentor failed to register a hit. HMS Ilex had sighted her and was joined by Dainty and Decoy in the depth-charging, later joined also by Voyager. At first, British Intelligence would assume that they had sunk Salpa and later changed it to Uarsciek, but this was not the case.
Loss of Uebi Scebeli
Uebi Scebeli (T.V. Bruno Zani) was sighted by HMS Ilex, this time joined by Dainty, Decoy, and Defender. She immediately submerged. A first pattern of depth charges put out the lights, and a second one disabled the electric motors. She was very quickly brought to the surface and surrendered. The destroyers, now reinforced by HMAS Voyager, finished off by gunfire, and secret documents were recovered. She was the only submarine from the patrol line to be sunk; however, she was not in the position reported in the documents captured from Liuzzi. The others eluded the search.
Voyager had been detached to Alexandria to bring the secret documents seized on Liuzzi and Uebi Scebeli. As the two submarines attacked were not in the patrol line positions, Commander Thomas assumed–wrongly–that they had discovered the approach of the AS.1 convoy and moved to a new position. He swept across two of the positions listed (they were not identified in the report but were probably the northern two) fruitlessly and resumed his course.
Loss of Argonauta
Argonauta (T.V. Vittorino Cavicchia Scalamonti), after a fruitless patrol northwest of Alexandria, was attacked by enemy destroyers near Tobruk on 21 June. She suffered leaks, and her attack periscope was damaged. On the same day, HMS Hero attacked a submarine contact off Mersa Matruh; it was uncertain if this was Argonauta as her patrol report was lost. On the evening of 27 June, she sailed from Tobruk by following the coast as far as Ras El Hilal12 and then proceeded directly to Cape Colonne and Taranto for repairs. She was heard no more and disappeared with all hands: five officers and forty-three ratings. In the confusing actions on the morning of 29 June, she may have been sunk by Force C, but we cannot be certain. Three submarines were present; was there a fourth one? It is not impossible that she hit a drifting mine or was lost accidentally.
Loss of Rubino
The same day Sunderland aircraft ‘S’ (L.5804, Flight Lt. W.W. Campbell) of 230 Squadron, 201 Naval Cooperation Group from Malta (covering convoy MA.3), attacked Rubino (T.V. Luigi Trebbi) and hit her with two bombs behind the conning tower; she sank immediately. The aircraft pilot, Flight Lieutenant W.W. Campbell, would be awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for this attack. This was the second of three attacks on submarines by Campbell in two days, and it was believed that he had sunk two submarines. However, Rubino was his sole victim. The Italian submarine, believing the aircraft to be friendly, had not reacted in time. The Sunderland alighted in the sea and picked up four survivors, including two officers (S.T.V. Giuseppe Bracco and S.T.V. Giuseppe Germano) who were brought to Malta. Two officers and thirty-nine ratings went down with the submarine.
Three hours later it was the turn of Luciano Manara (T.V. Salvatore Todaro) returning to Trapani from her first patrol. As she approached Cape Spartivento, an aircraft was sighted and believed at first to be Italian, but it was an error. This was again Sunderland ‘S’ of 230 Squadron, fresh from its success with Rubino. The aircraft had no more bombs and only strafed the submarine, which replied with her anti-aircraft weapons before crash-diving. It had been a close call for the future ‘Knight of the Atlantic’.
As though this was not enough, Gemma (C.C. Guido Cordero di Montezemolo), which had sailed from Leros on 28 June for a patrol off Sollum, was attacked in error the following day by an Italian aircraft when about 76 miles southeast of Cape Sidero (Crete). Two small bombs exploded in her wake, barely 30 metres away. At the time, the identity of the aircraft was not ascertained but the submarine was rolling badly and prevented any reply with her gun armament. Wisely, Cordero di Montezemolo took his submarine to a depth of 30 metres and was not further disturbed.
In the evening, patrolling northwest of Malta, Tembien (T.V. Guido Gozzi) had a battery fire; it was quickly brought under control, and the submarine was able to resume patrol.
On 29 June, Tobruk harbour came under air attack by nine British bombers, the submarine Galatea (C.C. Bruno Pilli) participated in the defence by firing her Breda machine guns. She claimed to have shot down two aircraft.
Returning to Taranto from Tobruk, Bragadino (C.C. Bandino Bandini) was attacked on 30 June by a Swordfish from 824 Squadron from HMS Eagle with six 100-lb anti-submarine bombs and escaped by diving to eighty metres. The last air attack of the month occurred when Ondina, patrolling south of Zante, was bombed by an aircraft in the middle of the afternoon. This may have been an Italian aircraft, as apparently, no British aircraft filed any claim.
Atlantic
Italian submarine patrols in the Atlantic during June 1940
| Finzi (5 June…) |
The first Italian submarine to sail for the Atlantic was Finzi (C.C. Alberto Dominici). She departed from La Spezia on 3 June and, after a brief stop at Cagliari, proceeded to join her station on the 5th of the month. On 10 June, while still east of Gibraltar, all the officers and eighteen ratings were overcome by methyl chloride fumes caused by her air conditioning system. Fortunately, the problem was quickly identified; the submarine immediately surfaced and ventilated, and the bottles of methyl chloride were disposed of. Most of the men recovered after four of five days except two, who needed ten days. However, the delay prevented her from crossing the Straits of Gibraltar before the declaration of war. Off the Rock, on 12 June, she was detected by the destroyer HMS Watchman, who attacked her with depth charges. The Italian submarine escaped by diving to 108 metres. She was later hunted by the armed trawler Stella Sirius but managed to extricate herself and resume her trip. Stella Sirius would have the rare distinction of being sunk by French bombers during an air raid on Gibraltar on 25 September 1940. The attack was a reprisal for the British attempt on Dakar. Finzi made the passage across the Straits in the early hours of 14 June on the surface at 15 knots, this time unperturbed. She reached her patrol area off the Canary Islands but encountered only neutral vessels, except for a French sloop of the Bougainville class, which was out of range. She returned to her base on 10 July without having fired a single torpedo, but her Atlantic experience would be valuable for the submarines to follow.
Cappellini (C.C. Cristiano Masi) attempted to enter the Atlantic but was sighted near Cape Negro (Spanish Morocco) by the armed trawler HMT Arctic Ranger. At 0050 hours on 14 June, she fired a torpedo at the old destroyer HMS Vidette, who had been sent to hunt her, and missed; a second torpedo misfired. Hemmed in by shallow waters and having rudder defects, Masi decided to take refuge at Ceuta.
Sir Samuel Hoare, the British ambassador in Madrid, insisted that the crew should be interned and reported that he was successful. However, this proved to be optimistic. Cappellini, her repairs completed, had sailed shortly before midnight on 23 June and eluded British patrols. After lingering off Alboran to wait for instructions, she was finally ordered home and proceeded toward Cape de Gata. She had barely reached this area when a British steamer was sighted on a southerly course skirting the territorial waters. At 2106 hours, a torpedo was fired from a bow tube; the range was only 700 yards. Masi had no time to observe the result as a Spanish ship appeared on the scene, making straight for the submarine. He immediately took his submarine down and listened for results. There were none. The target was Cydonia (3,517 GRT, built 1927), who avoided the torpedo and made a signal. Shortly after, Cappellini returned to periscope depth; the British vessel had disappeared in the darkness. The Italian submarine reached La Spezia without further incidents.
Red Sea and Indian Ocean
Italian submarine patrols in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean during June 1940
| Galileo Galilei (10-20 June*) | Ferraris (10-14 June) | Galvani (10-24 June*) |
| Macallè (10-15 June*) | Torricelli (14-23 June*) | Archimede (19-26 June) |
| Perla (19 June…) | Guglielmotti (21-23 June) |
The extreme heat negatively affected the activities of the eight submarines based at Massawa.
Loss of Macallè
Defective air-conditioning units made life miserable for Italian submariners, and on 14 June, Macallè (T.V. Alfredo Morone) ran aground on Bar Musa Kebir islet after her crew was overcome by methyl chloride fumes which caused the death of one of them, Sottocapo silurista Carlo Acefalo. The submarine had serious leaks and finally sank in deep waters. An officer and two ratings took a small sailboat and, after a voyage of 200 miles in five days, managed to bring news of their predicament. The remaining survivors (four officers and thirty-eight ratings) were picked up by the Guglielmotti (C.C. Carlo Tucci). Macallè was the first Italian submarine to be lost during the Second World War.
The first attack in the Red Sea Theatre is not well documented. Luigi Galvani (C.C. Renato Spano) had sailed from Massawa for a patrol in the Gulf of Oman. On 13 June, she encountered a cruiser and a destroyer north of the Straits of Bab El Mandeb. She fired a single torpedo but missed; the target has not been identified. Galvani did not return from patrol.
On 16 June 1940, Galileo Galilei (C.C. Corrado Nardi) intercepted the Norwegian tanker James Stove (8,215 GRT, built 1931) in British Charter ten miles south of Aden. The ship was carrying oil from Singapore to Suez and was making for Aden. The submarine was seen from a distance as it was making a lot of smoke but was initially mistaken for the British. The tanker was ordered to stop and send a boat. The Chief Officer went over and reported he was hailed by an Italian officer, described as a “perfect gentleman.” He was ordered to evacuate within fifteen minutes as the ship would be sunk. This was done, and the thirty-four crew members boarded the two lifeboats. The submarine then fired a bow shot but missed, a second torpedo hit the target and the tanker began to settle by the stern. She was hit amidship by a third torpedo and disappeared beneath the waves; Galileo Galilei then submerged. All thirty-four survivors were later picked up by the armed trawler HMS Moonstone. The armed boarding vessel Chantala spotted the aggressor but could not bring her to action. The light cruiser HMNZS Leander launched a seaplane to hunt the submarine, but it failed to locate her. The next day, the search was extended in the Gulf of Aden with the destroyer Kandahar, the sloop Shoreham, and the auxiliaries Chakdina, Chantala, and Cornwallis while the armed trawler Moonstone patrolled off Aden.
Loss of Galileo Galilei
On 18 June, Galileo Galilei stopped the Yugoslav steamer Drava but released her upon examination. Shortly after, a Gloster Gladiator biplane of 94 Squadron piloted by Flight Officer Haywood spotted the submarine and shadowed it. In the afternoon, a Blenheim bomber (Flight Lieutenant Goodwin) of 8 Squadron arrived on the scene and dropped two anti-submarine bombs on the submarine, which was then attacked by a Vickers Vincent biplane of the same squadron. Galileo Galilei escaped serious damage. She was hunted during the night by the destroyer HMS Kandahar and the sloop Shoreham.
It was only at 1137 hours the next day that she was detected by Asdic at a range of 5,000 yards by the trawler Moonstone. Fourteen minutes later, a first depth charge was dropped, set at a depth of 150 feet. Contact was lost and then regained at 1220 hours. A second depth charge was dropped at 1226 hours, bringing the submarine to the surface, where she tried to escape at full speed. At about 2,500 yards the trawler opened fire with her 4-inch (102mm) gun. The first round was well over, but the next one was a direct hit, slowing down the submarine. Desperately, Galileo Galilei replied with her armament, but her fire was wild and erratic. When the range dropped to about 1,000 yards, Moonstone opened fire with her Lewis guns and even with rifles, raking the submarine deck and preventing the main deck gun from being manned. A second 4-inch round hit the base of the conning tower, sealing the fate of the submarine. Fifteen of her crew were killed, including Capitano di corvetta Nardi. The surviving members hauled down her colours and surrendered. The trawler had been hit by machine gun fire from the enemy and its only boat had been damaged so that she could not send a prize crew but had to await the arrival of the destroyer Kandahar.
In the meantime, a British bomber arrived on the scene unaware that the submarine had surrendered and, despite frantic signals from Moonstone, dived to attack. Two bombs were released, fortunately they missed, but then the aircraft machine-gunned the unfortunate survivors. The aircraft finally understood the situation and left the scene. The Italian submarine was boarded by a party from HMS Kandahar and was brought to Aden under her own power. Her captors would find the chest box and a variety of documents, including sailing orders and signal logs. Upon examination, it was found that one of her bow tubes was armed with an 18-inch (450mm) torpedo; it was not known at the time if this was due to a shortage of torpedoes at Massawa. The shortage was general for Italian submarines, and for economic reasons, they were usually fitted with two torpedo tubes with reduction rings to accommodate these torpedoes. This procedure dated at least from the Spanish Civil War. Galileo Galilei would become the British X.2, but her poor condition strictly relegated her to training duty.
This success had an unexpected drawback as Supermarina concluded that there was a chance that her codes were captured. As early as 24 June, Marisupao informed Maricosom and Supermarina that Galileo Galilei had failed to answer signals and that she carried documents revealing the secure routes at Massawa and Assab, the defensive minefields, and other secret documents, including the ciphers S.M.40/S, 41, 55 bis, 56, 58, 64 bis, A 55/S and A 58/S. The ciphers would be changed the following month, depriving the British of a valuable source of intelligence that predated the capture. The code books of Galileo Galilei had been destroyed before her capture; the British had seized them from Uebi Scebeli. To replace the code quickly, the Italian Navy reissued the old code book S.M. 19 S (known as ‘Sigma’ code) issued in July 1937 and in use in 1938. This codebook was still used but only during exercises, and a copy had been seized on Uebi Scebeli. However, the Egyptian-based section of Naval Intelligence did not pay attention to it and forgot to send it to England, resulting in Italian submarines being able to communicate in comparative safety for the remainder of the war. It was only after the Armistice that British Naval Intelligence would realise the blunder13. However, Italian submarines would remain vulnerable as other Italian codes were broken, particularly those used by the Dodecanese command.
Loss of Evangelista Torricelli
On 21 June, Evangelista Torricelli (C.C. Salvatore Pelosi) survived an attack from the destroyer HMS Kandahar with only slight damage. Two days later, she was sighted on the surface at a distance of 7,500 yards and was overwhelmed by the combined gunfire from Kandahar, Kingston, and Khartoum. After a desperate defence in which six ratings were killed, seven officers, forty-five ratings, and a civilian passenger were captured (one rating and the civilian would die in captivity). Pelosi would be awarded the Medaglia d’Oro. During the action, the destroyer Khartoum was hit by some fragments, which damaged the air vessel of one of her torpedo tubes, and she subsequently blew up in Perim harbor. This was disputed by a British Commission of Enquiry, which concluded that the loss had been accidental. Yet, Khartoum’s report admitted that some of the shells aimed at Kingston fell over ‘uncomfortably close,’ which cannot rule out a hit by a shell fragment.
Loss of Luigi Galvani
Luigi Galvani (C.C. Renato Spano) was sent to the Gulf of Oman. Following the capture of Galileo Galilei, papers were recovered, including Galvani’s operational orders, which indicated her patrol area14. On 24 June, she was surprised at night on the surface by HMS Falmouth, who attempted to ram her before depth-charging and sending her to the bottom. Four officers, including Spano, and twenty-seven ratings were picked up; three officers and twenty-two ratings were lost. 2° Capo Siluristo Pietro Venuti sacrificed his life by locking himself as the water was flooding his compartment. He was posthumously awarded the Medaglia d’Oro15. She did not sink HMIS Pathan on 23 June, as reported in various publications; this sloop was most likely the victim of an internal explosion.
The tribulations of Perla
While on patrol in the Gulf of Tajura, the crew of Perla (T.V. Mario Pouchain) was overcome by methyl chloride gas after her air conditioning system broke down. In these hot and humid areas, a vessel couldn’t operate effectively without adequate air conditioning, and surprisingly, the problem had not been solved in peacetime. On 26 June, the sloop HMS Shoreham, witnessing her predicament, carried out a depth charge attack, but the submarine escaped only to run aground on a reef some sixty miles south of Massawa. HMS Kingston arrived and opened fire on the submarine, soon joined by the light cruiser HMNZS Leander and the destroyer HMS Kandahar. The cruiser opened fire with her six-inch guns but did not appear to have caused much damage. The Walrus seaplane from the cruiser also dropped three bombs but missed. Perla, her deck gun unserviceable, was abandoned by most of the crew except for a few who took care of their agonising comrades. Fifteen crew members were dead. Fortunately, eight Italian SM.81 bombers arrived on the scene and forced the British squadron to withdraw.
An expedition was launched from Massawa to help the survivors while the destroyer Manin later arrived on the scene. The submarine was refloated and returned to Massawa, but it was a very narrow escape. Initially, the British believed that they had destroyed the submarine, but Italian aircraft pilots who fell into their hands in September would reveal that Perla was successfully towed to Massawa. The British East Indies Command came under criticism for having failed to destroy the submarine but invoked the necessity of escorting two convoys across the Red Sea at the time and a lack of warships to spare.
The tribulations of Archimede
Archimede (T.V. Mario Signorini) was on her way to patrol off Aden when, on 20 June, several men were suddenly violently sick from inhaling methyl chloride gas. Again, this was caused by the failure of the air conditioning system, and the heat became unbearable. Bravely, Signorini attempted to maintain the patrol, but one by one, members of the crew succumbed to intense headaches and abdominal pains, and he suffered from the same symptoms. By the afternoon of 23 June, one-third of the crew of sixty was incapacitated, and the number was increasing by the hour. The following afternoon, the patrol had to be abandoned. Six men were dead. Two torpedoes were removed from the stern tubes, and the bodies were loaded in their place to insulate the crew from the smell. In the early hours of 26 June, Archimede arrived at Assab and landed twenty men who were rushed to the hospital; twelve of them were near death. A few hours later, the submarine was attacked at anchor by three Blenheim bombers. Fortunately, their aim was wild, and their five bombs missed from 20 to 100 metres. Archimede replied with her machine guns and escaped damage.
For Marisupao (Comando Superiore Marina in Africa Orientale or the Italian Naval High Command in East Africa), the situation appeared bleak; its submarine force had been halved in less than two weeks of the opening of hostilities. With navigation through the Suez Canal closed to Italian shipping, there was no prospect of reinforcements.
- He was also in command of H.4 at the time. ↩︎
- No relation to the future ace Salvatore Todaro. ↩︎
- The target has not been identified. ↩︎
- Technically, before the war had even started! ↩︎
- Cf. Loss of HMS Calypso: Board of Enquiry in ADM1/10507 (TNA). ↩︎
- The British Squadron was disposed as follows:
a. Main body with the battleships HMS Warspite, HMS Malaya, and the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle.
b. The light cruisers HMS Calypso and HMS Caledon were 6 miles on the port wing of the Main Body.
c. The destroyers deployed in line abreast about ten miles ahead of the Main Body: HMS Dainty, Nubian (D.14) Mohawk, Janus, Juno, Hyperion (D.2), Havock, Hero, Hereward, Hostile, Hasty, Ilex and Imperial. ↩︎ - Some publications erroneously mention the date as 17 June. ↩︎
- This is not an error. By a curious coincidence, the two French commanders were named Leblanc and Le Blanc, respectively. ↩︎
- This was Legal Time (also known as Daylight Savings Time). The Italians had just changed their clocks the same day. The decrypt can be found in HW18/52 (TNA). Another signal believed to have emanated from Diamante, timed 0020/20, and mentioning Sidi Abeida, was also intercepted but not entirely deciphered. ↩︎
- In fact, Protée was just entering Alexandria. ↩︎
- This was the second major anti-submarine sweep of the war resulting from captured documents. The first occurred in April 1940 as a result of the seizure of the U-49 papers. This U-boat had been sunk in the Vaagsfjord during the invasion of Norway. The grid charts and other documents, including the HARTMUT operation orders (showing the U-boat dispositions during the WESERÜBUNG operation), were recovered when the German crew threw them into the water without weighing them. A sweep involving nine destroyers had been intended to dispose of the five U-boats from Group V (east of the Shetland Islands). It was not known at the time that the positions had already been vacated, and the presence of the only U-boat in the area was purely fortuitous. Although sighted, U–25 managed to slip through the net. ↩︎
- The claim that her wreck was located by sonar at Ras Hilal in 2012 is an error and not supported by facts. The originator has made many frivolous claims of this type in the past. ↩︎
- Cf. HW3/19: Clarke’s work on Italian cypher systems in GCCS (TNA). ↩︎
- Cf. ADM223/488 (TNA). ↩︎
- In 2016, his name was given to a submarine. ↩︎