November 1940
| 7-11 | November | Force H attempted to reinforce HMS Illustrious with three Fulmar fighters (Operation COAT) and bomb Cagliari (Operation CRACK). |
| 11-12 | November | Swordfish aircraft from HMS Illustrious attacked the Italian Fleet in Taranto (Operation JUDGMENT). Three battleships (half the Italian Battle Fleet) were sunk or badly damaged. |
| 15-19 | November | Force H attempted to reinforce Malta with Hurricane fighters and bomb Alghero airfield (Operation WHITE). |
| 15-18 | November | British forces occupied Suda Bay in Crete (Operation BARBARITY). |
| 24-30 | November | Operation COLLAR (reinforcements for Malta from Gibraltar). |
| 27-28 | November | Battle of Cape Spartivento (known as Cape Teulada in Italian sources). |
On the first day of the month, the Duce, accompanied by Admiral Cavagnari, visited the naval base of Taranto, including the submarine barracks. He boarded the battleships Littorio and Giulio Cesare, the heavy cruiser Pola, and the destroyer Camicia Nera. In ten days the base would be the object of a devastating attack by the Fleet Air Arm.
On 3 November, C.F. Giuseppe Mellina from the submarine Glauco began a visit to the Gotenhafen submarine training base. He was one of four Italian commanders taking a training course in Germany; the others were C.C. Giuseppe Caridi of Calvi, C.C. Raccanelli of Tazzoli, and T.V. Alberto Crepas of Argo. He observed the exercises from the bridge of the submarine depot ship Wilhelm Bauer who was part of a convoy with the freighter Ahrensburg and the depot ship Saar, escorted by four anti-submarine trawlers and three torpedo boats, all of them equipped with S-Gerät (the German Asdic equivalent). The attacks were carried out by U–105 and U–144. The German submarines displayed a superior speed to their Italian counterparts, which was a factor that revealed their advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic. Mellina also noted the necessity of equipping submarines with extra pairs of binoculars as the build-up of humidity reduced their effectiveness after a while. Initially, German submarines were equipped with eight pairs of binoculars; they now sailed with at least sixteen pairs of binoculars. In one recent patrol, a U-boat returned with only eight pairs of functional binoculars from the twenty-two it carried. Admiral Parona, noting the comments made by Mellina, would hope that similar types of exercises could be performed in the Gulf of Gascogne. Italian documents do not show evidence that this was ever the case. Though many lessons were learned, it was doubtful that a nine-day course was enough to bring Italian commanders up to par with their German counterparts. In a few months, this would lead to the creation of a training centre at Gotenhafen known as Marigammasom.
On 17 November, Admiral Parona travelled to Lorient, where he visited the U-boat base and met with Admiral Dönitz to discuss the role of Italian submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic. Parona inspected a U-boat and observed the departure of U–43 for an Atlantic patrol. Maggiore del Genio Navale G. Fenu came along to report on German U-boat design and characteristics. Also present in the delegation were T.V. Walter Auconi in charge of weaponry, and the liaison officer Korvettenkapitän Rösing.
Mediterranean
Italian submarine patrols in the Mediterranean during November 1940
| Scirè (…3 November) | Bragadino (…5 November) | Corridoni (…6 November) |
| Delfino (…6 November) | Zaffiro (…6 November) | Settembrini (…6 November) |
| Narvalo (…7 November) | Tricheco (…7 November) | Dessié (…8 November) |
| Menotti (…8 November) | Ondina (3-4 November) | Nereide (4-5 November) |
| Ondina (5-6 November) | Nereide (6-7 November) | Capponi (8-10 November) |
| Bandiera (8-13 November) | Topazio (8-13 November) | Santarosa (8-9 November) |
| Corallo (9-13 November) | Medusa (9-12 November) | Diaspro (9-12 November) |
| Aradam (9-12 November) | Alagi (9-13 November) | Axum (9-13 November) |
| Mameli (10-13 November) | Jalea (12-13 November) | Nereide (12-13 November) |
| Ondina (12-13 November) | Malachite (12-13 November) | Jalea (14-22 November) |
| Millelire (14-22 November) | Ondina (15 November) | Nereide (15 November) |
| Diaspro (15-19 November) | Aradam (15-19 November) | Bandiera (15-19 November) |
| Alagi (16-19 November) | Corallo (16-19 November) | Onice (17-26 November) |
| H.2 (19-20 November) | Bandiera (19-23 November) | Tembien (19-23 November) |
| Corallo (19-23 November) | Nereide (21 November) | Da Procida (21 November) |
| Sirena (22 November…) | Nereide (22 November…) | Atropo (23-27 November) Pt.1 |
| Delfino (24 November…) | Mameli (26-28 November) | Alagi (26-30 November) |
| Axum (26-30 November) | Dessié (26 November…) | Aradam (26 November…) |
| Diaspro (26 November…) | Tembien (26 November…) | Narvalo (26-27 November)x |
| Narvalo (27-29 November)x |
This month witnessed renewed submarine activity in the Malta area.
On the night of 8/9 November, Santorre Santarosa (C.C. Guido Coscia) had sailed from Messina for a patrol near Malta when she collided with the motor sailing vessel Giuseppe e Maria (V.104, 93 tons), who sank. After picking up ten survivors, the submarine had to turn back for repairs.
During the morning of 9 November, a reconnaissance aircraft from 93° Gruppo signalled the presence of an important naval force on a westerly course southwest of Sardinia. Before noon, they were attacked by the Regia Aeronautica. This was Force H with the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, the battleship Barham, and the cruisers Berwick, Glasgow, and Sheffield, screened by eleven destroyers. The objective was to fly off three Fulmar fighters for Malta, to reinforce HMS Illustrious, and simultaneously bomb Cagliari as a diversion (Operations COAT and CRACK) to Operation JUDGMENT. They came under air attack from twenty S.79 of 32° Stormo and were near-missed by several bombs but escaped serious damage.
The submarines Alagi, Aradam, Axum, Diaspro, and Medusa sailed from Cagliari to form a barrage north of Cape Bougaroni to intercept Force H, but it was too late. Bad luck continued to plague the Italian submarines in this theatre. In the late afternoon on 9 November, Otaria (C.C. Giuseppe Vocaturo) sighted an aircraft carrier and three destroyers at a distance of 20,000 metres, on a northerly course about 170 miles east of Malta. In the same area, the Regia Aeronautica had already reported the presence of an aircraft carrier, two battleships, two cruisers, and six destroyers earlier that day. The same evening, Topazio (C.C. Emilio Berengan), patrolling southeast of Malta, observed four light cruisers and two destroyers at 4,000 metres but could not gain a favourable position and had to abort her attack. These were probably units from the Third or Seventh Cruiser Squadron. A few hours later, Capponi (C.C. Romeo Romei) discovered the main body about 120 miles southeast of Malta. At the maximum range of 4,000 metres, she fired three 533mm torpedoes at what she believed was one of two heavy cruisers and an aircraft carrier, claiming two hits, but missed. She refrained from firing a full salvo of four torpedoes as she only had a 450mm torpedo left with a shorter range. The targets were the battleships HMS Warspite and Valiant and the aircraft carrier Illustrious, escorted by the destroyers Decoy and Defender. A single torpedo hit might have altered the events of the next 48 hours as half of the Italian battle fleet at Taranto would be crippled by Swordfish torpedo bombers from Illustrious. The battleship Ramillies had entered Malta on the evening of 9 November, and Italian air reconnaissance reported her the following day. It was assumed that she had been damaged by Capponi, and Romeo was awarded the Medaglia d’Oro.
Late afternoon on the 10th, Mameli was ordered to sail from Messina to patrol off Malta but made no contact.
On the night of 10/11 November, Topazio had another opportunity when she attacked convoy ME.3 on its way to Malta. Two torpedoes were fired at the battleship Ramillies, covering the convoy, consisting of the transports Memnon, Lanarkshire, Clan Macaulay, and Clan Ferguson escorted by the anti-aircraft cruiser Coventry and the destroyers Decoy and Defender. In the submarine, two explosions were heard (Ramillies reported hearing three) in the submarine, but these were probably torpedoes hitting the sea bed.
During the evening of 11 November, twenty-one Swordfish took off in two waves from HMS Illustrious to attack Taranto. By midnight, the battleships Littorio, Conte di Cavour, and Duilio were crippled by torpedoes. This was a serious blow to the Regia Marina, and the remaining battleships were forced to relocate to Naples.
Following the attack on Taranto, Malachite, Jalea, Ondina, and Nereide sailed from this base. It was too late to intercept the enemy, who had retired. The submarines were very quickly recalled.
On 15 November, Force H sailed again from Gibraltar for Operation WHITE (reinforcements of fighter aircraft for Malta). It consisted of the battlecruiser HMS Renown flying the flag of Vice Admiral Somerville, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and Argus, the cruisers Sheffield and Despatch, and seven destroyers. This time, Italian Naval Intelligence was informed very quickly, and despite the disaster at Taranto, the Italian battle fleet was still a very potent force. The battleships Vittorio Veneto (flying the flag of Admiral Campioni) and Giulio Cesare, the heavy cruisers Pola, Fiume, Gorizia, Trieste, Trento, and Bolzano escorted by the destroyers of 9th, 12th, and 13th Squadrons departed from Naples and other ports to take up a position about sixty miles southwest of Sardinia. Their presence forced Somerville to fly off the aircraft from HMS Argus from position 37°24’ N, 06°52’ E, off Philippeville (modern-day Skikda). This was further west than needed, and only four Hurricanes and a Skua would reach the embattled island. Eight Hurricanes and one Skua ran out of fuel and were lost. The bombing of Alghero airfield by Swordfish from Ark Royal was cancelled. The submarines Aradam, Alagi, Diaspro, Bandiera, and Corallo were sailed from Cagliari, the first three to form a barrage north of Cape Bougaroni and the remaining two to patrol southeast of Malta to intercept them. Bad weather prevented them from sighting anything. The light cruiser HMS Newcastle had sailed independently from Gibraltar with RAF personnel and stores for Malta and managed to slip through undetected.
On the afternoon of 23 November, Onice (T.V. Gustavo Lovatelli), on patrol 90 miles northwest of Alexandria, discovered an enemy naval squadron consisting of an aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and three destroyers at a distance of 20,000 metres. These were probably the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle with the battleships Malaya and Ramillies, cruisers and destroyers; they had sailed from Alexandria to cover the convoy MW.4 destined for Malta (Operation M.B.9). Lovatelli elected to remain submerged and listen with his hydrophones as the enemy ships moved away. He was criticized for having failed to surface and close the range.
THE BATTLE OF CAPE SPARTIVENTO
Force H sailed from Gibraltar on 24 November to cover the convoy of Operation COLLAR, consisting of the fast transports Clan Forbes, Clan Fraser, and New Zealand Star1.
To counter this move, Supermarina ordered to sea the battleships Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare, six heavy cruisers, and ten destroyers2. On the 26th, they departed from Naples and Messina to make their junction south of Sardinia. In addition, a squadron of four torpedo boats sailed from Trapani to patrol off Cape Bon. The submarines Alagi, Aradam, Axum, and Diaspro were deployed on a patrol line north of Tunisia; they failed to find anything. Tembien and Dessié took up positions to the northwest of Malta and Mameli to the southeast of the island. Just after midnight on the 27th, the torpedo boat Sirio detected a force of seven ships off Cape Bon and attacked them with two torpedoes without scoring a hit before they disappeared in the darkness. Before midnight, twenty-five miles west of Comino (Malta), Tembien (T.V. Guido Gozzi) fired two torpedoes at a slow-moving warship, and five minutes later, another two at another but missed both targets. They were the cruisers Gloucester (C.S.3), York, and Glasgow on their way to join Force H. A few hours later, thirty miles northeast of Linosa, Dessié (T.V. Adriano Pini) fired two torpedoes at three warships from long range, these were probably the same ships that reported a heavy underwater explosion at about the same time. The 18th Cruiser Squadron reported two underwater explosions at 0138 hours on 28 November, this may have related to an attack from the torpedo-boat Calliope. The battle of Cape Spartivento3 developed, but Italian submarines would not take any further part.
Italian submarines were also deployed against Greece, but, for unexplained reasons, they displayed little offensive spirit toward their new foe. Submarines were used to cover the convoys to Albania, a role they were ill-suited for, and which would yield no results as there was little enemy interference. They appeared more determined to attack the British Fleet, although Greek island traffic could have provided easy pickings, and the air threat in the Aegean was minimal.
On the 17th, Domenico Millelire (C.C. Francesco De Rosa de Leo) encountered a submarine fifteen miles west of Othonoi (near Corfu). She fired two torpedoes but missed; the Italian commander was criticised for having failed to make use of his gun. The target was probably the Royal Hellenic submarine Proteus (Lt Cdr Michail Khadzicostandis) on her way to a patrol off the Albanian coast. On her next patrol, this submarine was rammed by the torpedo boat Antares and lost with all hands after sinking the troop transport Sardegna.
At 2220 hours on 20 November, Medusa (C.C. Enzo Grossi) on passage from Messina to Pola, was near Bari when two torpedoes were reported to have missed her. The “attack” was bogus. The following day, the torpedo boats Altair and Aretusa and MAS-512, MAS-513, MAS-514, MAS-534, MAS-535, MAS-538, and MAS-539 sailed from Brindisi to take part in the hunt. Altair claimed to have sighted a submarine, but no Allied submarine had operated in this area. The claim that HMS Regulus was sunk during this hunt can be refuted. This submarine had sailed from Alexandria on the morning of the 18th and could not have reached this area in time. In any case, she had orders to go to the Gulf of Taranto, and it was only on the 23rd that her patrol area was shifted to the Straits of Otranto.
The British Mediterranean Fleet organized convoys to help the Greeks. Initially, assistance was limited to Royal Air Force maintenance staff and stores and Army antiaircraft defences, but would later include an Expeditionary Corps. As Operation WHITE was carried out in the western Mediterranean, a fast convoy was sent to occupy Suda Bay – this was Operation BARBARITY. A British garrison relieved the Greek one and established an advanced base to threaten Italian communications with the Dodecanese. The operation was covered by the Mediterranean Fleet4. Interference from Leros-based submarines to the convoys to Greece would be negligible.
On 21 November, in the Skiathos Channel, the Greek destroyer Aetos attacked a submarine with fourteen depth charges after she claimed to have avoided a torpedo. However, the attack was apparently bogus.
The same day, a decrypt revealed to British Naval Intelligence that the submarines Neghelli, Naiade, and Atropo were due to arrive in the Dodecanese on 25, 26, and 27 November, respectively. They were to pass through point E, which the capture of documents from Durbo had revealed to be 36°30’ N, 26°30’ E. The first two were to reinforce the local defence, while the third brought badly needed supplies to these islands. They had been virtually cut off from the motherland since the start of the war with Greece. Surprisingly, the information did not seem to elicit much reaction from Admiral Cunningham, and no attempts were made to hunt these submarines. In fact, the Mediterranean Fleet5 sailed on 25 November and, the next day, was within striking range and might have been exposed needlessly. At 0230 hours on the 26thin position 35°50’ N, 25°50’ E, the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, the cruisers Gloucester and Glasgow, and four destroyers were detached to conduct a raid on Port Laki (aka Portolago, the main submarine base on Leros in the Dodecanese). Shortly after, Naiade (T.V. Pietro Notarbartolo di Villarosa) sighted three enemy destroyers and escaped by diving to 60 metres. The other two submarines reached their destination without incident.
Nevertheless, on 29 November, Delfino (C.C. Alberto Avogrado di Cerrione Trotti Bentivoglio), operating from Leros, attacked a Greek convoy screened by three destroyers twelve miles west of Kalogeri Rocks (between Chios and Andros) and missed the destroyer Spetsai proceeding in company with Vassilissi Georgios and Kondouriotis. Spetsai hurriedly dropped depth charges. However, they failed to explode. The same evening, Delfino spotted a submarine of the Katsonis class eighteen miles north of Cape Tripti but could not gain an attacking position in time, and the submarine escaped by diving. There was no evidence of enemy or friendly submarines in the vicinity.
It was a frustrating month for the sommergibili as they had several opportunities but nothing to show.
Atlantic
Italian submarine patrols in the Atlantic during November 1940
| Veniero (…2 November) | Bianchi (…3 November)x | Nani (…4 November) |
| Cappellini (…4 November) | Brin (…4 November)x | Emo (…6 November)x |
| Bagnolini (…7 November)x | Malaspina (…9 November) | Otaria (…15 November) |
| Dandolo (…15 November) | Barbarigo (…15 November) | Faà di Bruno (…15? November*) |
| Baracca (…24 November) | Morosini (…28 November) | Marconi (…28 November) |
| Velella (1-8 November)6 | Giuliani (11 November…) | Tarantini (11 November…) |
| Torelli (12 November…) | Argo (22 November…) | Mocenigo (24 November…) |
| Velella (25 November…) |
On 3 November, both Benedetto Brin (T.V. Luigi Longanesi Cattani) and Michele Bianchi (C.C. Adalberto Giovannini) made the Gibraltar crossing successfully7. However, Bianchi had attempted the passage deep and encountered a strong current. She hit bottom heavily at a depth of 142 metres and took refuge in neutral Tangiers for repairs. She was watched by the destroyer HMS Greyhound. The next day, Benedetto Brin was located by aircraft, and British destroyers were sent to hunt her; she also escaped to Tangiers. The British consul and Intelligence officers would follow their stay with great interest.
On 1 November, Velella (T.V. Pasquale Terra) departed from La Spezia for the Atlantic, but defects forced her to turn back before reaching Gibraltar. She sailed again on the 25th of the month.
In the early days of the month, bad weather hampered Italian submarine operations in the Atlantic Theatre. On 2 November, a big wave carried off a lookout from Emo (C.C. Carlo Liannazza) while another was injured. The submarine returned to search for the man; but in vain. The following day, Liannazza was injured, and the patrol had to be aborted.
In the afternoon of 4 November, nearly 400 miles west of Ireland, Malaspina (C.F. Mario Leoni) discovered a southbound convoy of seventeen ships escorted by an armed merchant cruiser. Leoni shadowed it, intending to attack in the evening. This was the OG.45 convoy bound for Gibraltar, but the armed merchant cruiser thwarted his attack. In fact, a few hours later, from six miles away, his submarine was spotted by the British Glenaffric (Rear-Admiral H C. Candy, CBE, commodore of the convoy). Another attempt to close the convoy the next morning was foiled by the armed merchant cruiser HMS Salopian as she opened fire on the submarine with her six-inch guns, forcing her to submerge.
Otaria (C.C. Giuseppe Vocaturo) discovered ships but failed to intercept them until a large liner was sighted on 5 November; her two torpedoes failed to find their mark.
Loss of Faà di Bruno
On 31 October, Faà di Bruno (C.C. Aldo Enrici) sailed for her first patrol from Bordeaux and disappeared without a trace with her crew of seven officers and forty-eight ratings. It is likely she had located convoy OG.45 and was probably the submarine which, on the afternoon of 6 November, attacked with gunfire Melrose Abbey II, the vice-commodore ship of the convoy. This vessel had fallen behind after colliding with the British Garbattran, sinking the latter and having to pick up her survivors. As the destroyers HMCS Ottawa and HMS Harvester went to her assistance, a surfaced submarine was sighted, shelling the merchant ship. At 1339 hours, both destroyers opened fire at a range of about 4.5 miles and forced the submarine to submerge. They began a systematic anti-submarine search but made no contact before the evening, carrying several depth-charge runs. Eighty-two depth charges were dropped (sixty-one by Harvester and twenty-one by Ottawa), some set at a depth of 350 feet and some to 500 feet; a large patch of oil was observed. The positions of the attacks were recorded by HMCS Ottawa as 50°45′ N, 17°49′ W and by HMS Harvester as 51°05′ N, 17°32′ W. The fact that contact was obtained only five hours after the submarine had submerged and since there were whales in the area has cast doubts on the result. However, this attack may well have accounted for Faà di Bruno.
Vice-Admiral Parona in Bordeaux (5 October 1940) (USMM)
On 8 November, Marconi (C.C. Giulio Chialamberto) intercepted a message from Cornish City. This was the commodore ship of convoy HX.84, which had been attacked three days prior by the pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer. The very same convoy had dispersed after being defended to the death by the armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay. The Italian submarine homed in on a signal reporting an explosion, probably that of the Swedish Vingaland hit by a Focke Wulf 200 Kondor of I/KG.40. In the afternoon, Marconi was detected by the destroyers HMS Hesperus and Havelock as they were also rushing to the scene. Havelock dropped eighteen depth charges on the submarine, which escaped by going down to 125 metres. A large bubble of air and a patch of oil were observed. This would later lead to the theory that Faà di Bruno was the victim, but Marconi was certainly the target, and she escaped with only minor damage. Two days later, Marconi reached the abandoned Vingaland (2,734 GRT, built 1935) and finished her off with torpedoes. Six men had been killed, and nineteen survivors were picked up by the British Danae II.
At about the same time, Barbarigo (C.C. Giulio Ghiglieri), returning to Bordeaux, had altered course to intercept an aircraft carrier and three destroyers reported by Otaria. The submarine came across a destroyer and fired a torpedo without success.
On 14 November, Marconi observed a lone merchant vessel of 8-10,000 tons zigzagging at 15 knots but could not close to less than 2,500 metres and fired a single torpedo which missed. It was a difficult shot, and Chialamberto judged that the track angle did not warrant firing a second one.
The bad weather had not abated and Finzi had to break off intercept attempts at convoys on 16 and 18 November. In the first attempt, having reached a speed of 13.5 knots, she embarked water from the stern and had to slow down to 4 knots. In the second attempt, she reached 14 knots but could not maintain this speed on the present course and was forced to slow down to 8 knots. Italian submarines rarely moved at over 12 knots, making effective interception difficult. During the following days, several similar attempts from other Italian submarines yielded the same result.
On 18 November, Baracca (C.C. Enrico Bertarelli), running out of fuel, was on her way home when she came across the Lilian Moller (4,866 GRT, built 1913), a straggler from convoy SLS.53D. A first torpedo was avoided, and the British ship managed to fend off the submarine for an hour and a half before a second torpedo spelled her doom. As the submarine closed a lifeboat firing shots were heard and it was not clear if its occupants were firing at the submarine or committing suicide, Baracca hurriedly left the scene. The lifeboat would never be found, and there would be no survivors from this ship. Her Master, William Fowler, and forty-eight men, forty-two of them Chinese, went to their deaths. This was Bertarelli’s first and last success. Did the experience affect him? We do not know, but he never carried out another attack and was later criticised by Admiral Parona for his lack of determination. Relegated to training duties and given the command of the much older and smaller Medusa, he was killed when his submarine was torpedoed by HMS Thorn while exercising off Pola in January 1942.
Morosini (C.C. Alfredo Criscuolo) entered the Atlantic on 31 October and had a fruitless patrol off the Portuguese coast. On 20 November, she was ordered to intercept a convoy that had just sailed from Gibraltar (this was HG.47), but she cruised the area without sighting anything before resuming her passage to Bordeaux.
Red Sea and Indian Ocean
Italian submarine patrols in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean during November 1940
| Guglielmotti (1-6 November) | Ferraris (7-13 November) | Archimede (22-28 November) |
| Ferraris (23-27 November) |
On 26 November, Ferraris (C.C. Livio Piomarta) carried out the last attack of Massawa-based submarines, firing three torpedoes from the surface at three different targets in a heavily escorted British convoy, claiming two merchant ships damaged and one sunk. This was convoy SW.3, made up of the liners Georgic, Monarch of Bermuda, Duchess of York, Orontes, City of Capetown, Brisbane Star, and Highland Brigade, which had sailed from Suez for Durban and was screened by the light cruiser HMS Caledon, the sloops HMS Flamingo and HMAS Parramatta and the destroyer HMS Kimberley. Caledon reported three underwater explosions, but none of the targets were hit.
- The force was divided into three groups:
Force B: the battlecruiser Renown (flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, Force H), the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the light cruisers Sheffield and Despatch, and the destroyers Faulknor (D.8), Firedrake, Forester, Fury, Duncan (D.13), Wishart, Encounter, Kelvin and Jaguar.
Force F: the light cruisers Manchester (flagship of Vice-Admiral L.E. Holland, CS.18) and Southampton, the destroyers Hotspur and Vidette, and the corvettes Peony, Salvia, Gloxinia and Hyacinth with the transports Clan Forbes, Clan Fraser, and New Zealand Star.
Force D: the battleship Ramillies, the heavy cruiser Berwick, the light cruisers Newcastle and Coventry, and the destroyers Defender, Greyhound, Gallant, Hereward, and Diamond. ↩︎ - The Italian battlefleet:
Battleships Vittorio Veneto (flagship Admiral Campioni) and Giulio Cesare, the heavy cruisers Pola, Fiume (flagship Admiral Matteucci, First Cruiser Division), Gorizia, Trieste, and Bolzano They were screened by the destroyers Alfieri, Carducci, Gioberti, Freccia, Saetta, Dardo, Libeccio, Lanciere, Ascari, Corazziere, Granatiere, Fuciliere, Bersagliere and Alpino. ↩︎ - For a detailed study of this battle, cf. La Battaglia di Capo Teulada by Francesco Mattesini (USMM, Rome, 2000). ↩︎
- The battleships HMS Barham and HMS Valiant, the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle, and eight destroyers. ↩︎
- The battleships HMS Warspite (Admiral Cunningham) and Valiant and the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious were escorted by the destroyers Jervis, Janus, Juno, Mohawk, Nubian, Griffin, Decoy, Waterhen, and Wryneck and later joined by the Third Cruiser Squadron. ↩︎
- Velella sailed for the Atlantic but had to turn back due to defects. ↩︎
- It has been stated elsewhere that the passage was made easier as only one anti-submarine trawler was on patrol, the destroyers having been sent away for Operation RATION. This is incorrect. Operation RATION was carried out on 22 November, and destroyers available at that time were patrolling the Straits and attacking several doubtful sonar contacts. ↩︎