October 1940

General Events

12	October	Operation SEA LION was postponed indefinitely.
23	October	Hitler met Franco at Hendaye (France) but failed to convince him to join the fight against England.
28	October	Italy attacked Greece. Germany remained neutral in the dispute, at least for the time being. At first, the Greek government was reluctant to seek help from Great Britain, as it feared that it might provoke Germany.

Italian submarine organisation in October 1940

During the summer of 1940, four new submarines, Bianchi, Torelli, Malaspina, and Baracca, briefly joined II Grupsom (Naples) before sailing for the Atlantic. With the loss of several boats, the squadron system was abolished, and the submarines were reorganised into thirteen Flotillas.

The most important new flotilla was XI Grupsom (Betasom). It was comprised of submarines from other flotillas and by the end of the summer, they started crossing into the Atlantic to join their new base in Bordeaux. Although nominally under the command of Admiral Falangola, the group became a separate command led by Vice-Admiral Parona. Eventually, he would be succeeded by C.V. Romolo Polacchini (later promoted to Rear-Admiral) and later by C.V. Enzo Grossi. In the next few months, twenty-seven submarines would sail from the Mediterranean to join the French base. By May 1941, they would be reinforced by the four survivors from the Red Sea Flotilla (abolished with the fall of the East African colonies). Much later, a large submarine, the Ammiraglio Cagni, was the last unit to make the trip across the Straits of Gibraltar, while a midget submarine (C.A.2) was temporarily assigned for the planning of an attack on New York. It was to be carried out by Da Vinci, but the project never materialised.

Reorganization of the submarine flotillas

I Grupsom	La Spezia (C.F. Beretta)
II Grupsom	Naples (C.F. M. Lazzeri)
III Grupsom	Messina (C.F. G. Biagi)
IV Grupsom	Taranto (C.F. F. Padolecchia)
V Grupsom	Leros (C.F. A Mirone), now independent from III Grupsom.
VI Grupsom	Tobruk, now independent from IV Grupsom but temporarily vacated.
VII Grupsom	Cagliari (C.F. G. Di Gropello), also included La Maddalena
Grupsom Trapani (later VIII Grupsom)	Trapani (C.F. L. Morra), now independent from III Grupsom.
Grupsom Brindisi (later IX Grupsom)	Brindisi (C.F. L. Caneschi), now independent from IV Grupsom.
Grupsom Augusta (later X Grupsom)	Augusta (T.V.s. S. Scuderi), now independent from III Grupsom
XI Grupsom (Betasom)	Bordeaux (Rear-Admiral Parona)
Commando Gruppo Scuola Smg. (later XII Mariscuolasom)	Pola [Training Flotilla] (C.C. F. Buonamici)
Flottiglia Sommergibili A.O.I.	Massawa [Red Sea Flotilla] (C.C. S. Spagone).

Examining the reports of the activities of Italian submarines in the Mediterranean for the period of 13 August to 10 September, Admiral Cavagnari, in his letter of 20 October to Admiral Falangola, expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of results obtained. Only two torpedoes were fired at a small vessel (Bianchi’s attack of 25 August), and one of them was fired in error. A handwritten note at the bottom of the text, probably by Admiral Falangola himself, acidly added that the total lack of air-to-sea cooperation had not been mentioned.

Four Italian officers participated in the first session of the U-boat tactical school at Gotenhafen. They were C.C. Giuseppe Mellina (Glauco), C.C. Giuseppe Caridi (Calvi), C.C. Vittore Raccanelli (Tazzoli) and T.V. Alberto Crepas (Argo).

The first Betasom patrol reports reached Supermarina. On 19 October, Admiral Somigli noted the number of torpedoes (four) required to sink the tanker British Fame by Malaspina on 12 August and the damage to Hermes, which Dandolo should have finished off on 21 August. He suggested that, given the importance of tankers in the war effort, more torpedoes ought to have been fired, echoing Admiral Parona’s thoughts.

Mediterranean

Italian submarine patrols in the Mediterranean during October 1940

Medusa (…1 October)	Berillo (…2 October*)	Beilul (…4 October)
Serpente (…5 October)	Gemma (…8 October*)	Tembien (…8 October)
Mameli (…8 October)	Tricheco (…8 October)	Colonna (…9 October)
Ametista (…10 October)	Ambra (…13 October)	Zaffiro (3-10 October)
Zoea (7-22 October)	Lafolè (8-20 October*)	Durbo (8-18 October)
Foca (8-15? October*)	Bragadino (8-9 October)	Topazio (11-28 October)
Toti (11-15 October)	Anfitrite (11-28 October)	Bandiera (12-25 October)
Ascianghi (13-25 October)	Santarosa (13-24 October)	Speri (13-23 October)
Corridoni (13-19 October) Pt.1	Bragadino (14-15 October)	Bragadino (18-19 October)
Scirè (21 October…)	Dessié (23 October…)	Settembrini (23 October…)
Jantina (23-26 October)	Bragadino (23-24 October)	Marcello (24-26 October)
Salpa (24-26 October)	Menotti (24 October…)	Nereide (24-25 October)
Bragadino (26 October…)	Atropo (27 October…)	Tricheco (27 October…)
Narvalo (27 October…)	Corridoni (27 October…)	Zaffiro (27 October…)
Delfino (27 October…)

Loss of Berillo

The month started badly as Berillo (T.V. Camillo Milesi Ferretti), on patrol northwest of Mersa Matruh, was experiencing leaks and successive defects that the crew tried to remedy. In the early hours of 2 October, a moonless but clear night, a shadow was seen at 6,000 metres. The submarine closed on the surface and recognised it to be a British destroyer, followed by another. A single torpedo was fired from 800 metres at the first target estimated to be doing 24 knots, another two torpedoes were fired from 600 metres, all three from her bow tubes. Feretti intended to fire a fourth torpedo and then turn around to fire his two stern torpedoes but was thwarted as the destroyers had discovered him. These were HMS Havock (Commander Rafe Edward Courage, DSO, DSC), and Hasty (Lieutenant Commander Lionel Rupert Tyrwhitt). Earlier, the two destroyers had been escorting the AN.4 convoy but had been detached to proceed independently to Alexandria. HMS Havock came across the submarine and opened fire as Berillo submerged, and one shell was observed to hit aft. The destroyer followed up with a depth charge attack, dropping fifteen of them. However, they were set too shallow, and the submarine had gone very deep. It now struggled to maintain its trim, porpoising from thirty to 130 metres. At 0431 hours, Hasty dropped five depth charges staggered from 100 to 250 feet, followed six minutes later by five more, set between 150 and 350 feet. At 0446 hours, the submarine was seen briefly to break the surface, and another depth charge was dropped. Contact was momentarily lost but regained at 0502 hours and a pattern of five depth charges was dropped and hammered again with four depth charges at 0512 hours. The needle of the depth-gauge was stuck at 140 metres, and Ferretti believed that a depth of 220 metres might have been reached. Berillo finally surfaced at 0546 hours and was sunk after a brief gun action in which two crew members were killed. Ferretti, four officers, and forty-one ratings were picked up and became prisoners of war.

Loss of Gemma

On the last day of September, Tricheco, Gemma, and Ametista departed from Leros to take up positions in the Aegean and south of Crete. At the same time, Ambra, Berillo, Colonna, Mameli, Serpente, and Tembien, already at sea in the Eastern Mediterranean, were ordered to extend their patrol by five days. They were deployed as a cover for Operation C.V., a large-scale attempt to supply the Dodecanese. This involved two fast merchant ships Sebastiano Venier and Calitea, under the protection of all seven Italian heavy cruisers and twelve destroyers. The surface ships were recalled when the Mediterranean Fleet was reported at sea. On board Tricheco (C.C. Alberto Avogrado di Cerrione Trotti Bentivoglio), during lunchtime on the 7th, a dispute between two ratings had resulted in severe head injury to the radiotelegraphist who was also the only hydrophone operator. By evening, his condition had not improved, and the commander decided to abort the mission. His difficulties were compounded as Marina Rodi did not immediately acknowledge the signal indicating his intention to return to base. After midnight, as Tricheco neared the island of Scarpanto, a submarine was observed on a parallel course. A torpedo was fired from the bow tube but missed; another followed and scored a direct hit. Unfortunately, the target was the submarine Gemma (C.C. Guido Cordero di Montezemolo). There were no survivors; five officers and forty ratings perished. Initially, Gemma had been ordered to patrol in the Kaso Straits but was then ordered to the area between Scarpanto and Rhodes, and Tricheco was not informed of her presence. Ametista (T.V. Virgilio Spigai) also saw the explosion in the vicinity. Tricheco would be sunk by the submarine HMS Upholder in 1942.

Following the cancellation of Operation C.V., the submarine Corridoni (C.C. Manlio Minucci) sailed from Taranto with stores for the Regia Aeronautica in the Dodecanese. British Intelligence was aware of her passage, and on 15 October, near Zante, she was depth-charged by an enemy destroyer but managed to reach her destination.

Nani (C.C. Gioacchino Polizzi) had sailed to join Betasom. On 4 October, when still east of Gibraltar, she fired a single torpedo at an 8,000-ton vessel escorted by a destroyer but without success.

Italian submarines did not participate in the battle of Cape Passero (11-12 October), which witnessed the light cruiser HMS Ajax‘s first use of radar in action. The British veteran of the battle of the River Plate was damaged, but the Italian destroyer Artigliere and the torpedo boats Alcione and Airone were sunk.

On 13 October, the submarine Aradam C.C. Giuseppe Bianchini) was damaged by an accidental fire in the officer’s quarters while moored in Naples; there were no casualties. The damage was not severe, and she was operational at the end of the month.

Zoea carried out another mine-laying mission. This time, twenty mines were laid off Jaffa on 14 October. This minefield did not yield immediate results, but the Greek destroyer Spetsai may have been damaged by one of its mines on 21 February 1943.

Loss of Foca

Carrying twenty mines on a similar mission to Haifa, Foca (C.C. Mario Giliberto) disappeared with all hands, possibly through an accidental explosion (eight officers and sixty-one ratings missing). At the time, she was believed to have run into an enemy defensive minefield off Haifa, but none had been laid by 15 October, and there was no evidence that her minefield had ever been laid. She had sailed from Taranto at dusk on 8 October. She was probably the submarine attacked at 1240 hours GMT on 10 October by Swordfish LP.E4B (Lt M.R. Maund, RM) of 813 Squadron (HMS Eagle) in 35°40′ N, 20°20′ E. The aircraft dropped four 100-lb anti-submarine bombs and observed an oil patch, but the result was uncertain. A couple of hours later, another aircraft from HMS Eagle attacked a submarine in the same vicinity, twenty miles ahead of the Mediterranean Fleet. Finally, at 1600 hours, in 35°33′ N, 20°01′ E, HMAS Vampire attacked a submarine contact with twenty-six depth charges and believed it was at least damaged if not sunk. If these attacks were against a genuine submarine, the only submarine in the vicinity was Foca. Another clue was possibly provided by the submarine HMS Parthian (Lt Cdr M.G. Rimington, DSO, RN), who reported she was missed by two torpedoes at 2015 hours on 12 October in position 33°23′ N, 21°55′ E (off Ras El Hilal). This attack may have been bogus as some of these were, but otherwise, it may have been carried out by Foca. Until her wreck is found, we shall never know for sure.

The sinking of HMS Triad

After midnight on 14 October, Santorre Santarosa (C.C. Guido Coscia), proceeding to patrol off Gavdo Island, encountered an enemy submarine, which was missed with one torpedo. This was almost certainly HMS Triad. The British submarine had apparently encountered Italian submarines on two consecutive nights. Twenty-four hours later, off Cape Colonne, the old submarine Enrico Toti (C.C. Bandino Bandini) was more fortunate, as a submarine was sighted at about 1,000 metres. The Italian submarine attempted to turn to port toward the enemy; at the same time, a torpedo was observed and missed astern. The Italian submarine received a 102mm shell on her conning tower, slightly wounding the gunnery officer and one rating but without inflicting vital damage. But Triad was faster and crossed her wake very close before passing about thirty metres along her port side. They were so close that the electrician Nicola Stagi threw his shoe at the enemy submarine! Toti raked Triad’s conning tower with machine gun and small arms fire, apparently wounding some as cries were distinctly heard. The British submarine was observed to submerge about 100 metres ahead; she was hit by a 120mm round and perhaps by a second one. Did this cause her loss or was she hit by a torpedo fired by the Italian submarine as she was diving? Although the bow of the enemy submarine was observed to come out vertically, Toti ’s action report only mentions a loud explosion heard inside the submarine without visual observation to confirm it. A second torpedo, set to a depth of nine metres, was fired, as well as a third round, but no further observation was made. Had the British submarine, in her haste, dived with an open hatch? The mystery will perhaps be solved when her wreck will be found.

This would be the only victory of the war achieved by Italian submarines over their British counterparts. Toti was feted upon her return to Brindisi but would require three weeks to repair her damages. It had been suggested that Rainbow was the submarine sunk as she fitted a closer resemblance to the Perseus class described by Bandini in his patrol report. Three arguments can be put forth to counter this proposition:

• Rainbow was supposed to have left the area the previous night and should have been well on her way to Alexandria.
• Triad’s patrol position was closer to Toti ’s track than Rainbow’s.
• Perseus’ silhouette was very similar to the R–class submarine. However, it must be remembered that Italian submariners were familiar with the Perseus-class, which had been seen numerous times before the war. It is not surprising that Bandini referred to them rather than the T-class submarines, which were brand new and had never been seen in peacetime by Italian forces. Their sizes were similar, the Rainbow had a larger displacement but was slightly shorter in length and their outline could easily be mistaken in the dark.

On 16 October, HMS Pandora spotted two Italian submarines north of Ras El Tin (Libya) and missed Topazio (C.C. Emilio Berengan) with two torpedoes The Italian submarine had detected the presence of the British submarine but refrained from attack because its identity could not be ascertained and Ascianghi was known to be in the vicinity.

Loss of Durbo

At dusk on 18 October, Durbo (T.V. Armando Acanfora) was detected when she surfaced about 70 miles east of Gibraltar and attacked by two Saunders-Roe London Flying boats of 202 Squadron piloted respectively by Flight Lieutenant N.F. Eagleton (K5909) and Flight Lieutenant P.R. Hatfield (K5913). The destroyers HMS Firedrake (Lt. Cdr. S.H. Norris, RN) and Wrestler (Lt. Cdr. E.N.V. Currey, RN) witnessed the attack and arrived on the scene. They observed oil bubbles, and both destroyers dropped depth charges, forcing the submarine to the surface at 1855 hours. It came immediately under fire but then dived very quickly. More depth charges followed, set at 250-350 feet, forcing the submarine up again at 1905 hours but again managed to dive. This time, the depth charges were set between 350 and 500 feet, and the submarine was finally brought to the surface one last time. It came under fire from both destroyers from about 1,000 to 1,500 yards and was abandoned. The entire crew of five officers and forty-one ratings were picked up. But her loss was most unfortunate, as British seamen had time to board her and retrieve some documents. They showed the patrol area of the submarine Lafolè, which would lead to her destruction two days later. Durbo was finished off by gunfire.

Loss of Lafolè

Based on the documents captured from Durbo, six destroyers were detailed to hunt for Lafolé. Shortly after noon on 20 October, Lafolè (T.V. Piero Riccomini) was caught off the Moroccan coast between Cape Quilates and Cape Agua by the destroyers Forester and Fury. In desperation, she fired a single torpedo at her attackers but missed. The two destroyers immediately counter-attacked with depth charges, but contact was lost. Three hours later, HMS Gallant obtained a contact and was soon joined by HMS Hotspur and an hour later by Griffin. They all hammered the submarine with depth charges. Finally, Gallant‘s pattern of depth charges forced the submarine to the surface, and Hotspur rammed her. Only one officer and eight ratings were picked up; three officers and thirty-six ratings went down with her. The survivors would praise the behavior of the officers and the crew, who remained calm to the end.

Zoea (C.C. Giorgio Bernabò) was returning to Taranto from her minelaying mission and, on 21 October, was about thirty miles from Cape Colonne when two lookouts witnessed a submarine that quickly submerged. The Italian submarine remained on the surface and cleared the area at the best possible speed. This was HMS Parthian (Lt. Cdr. M.G. Rimington, DSO, RN) which attempted to ram but quickly lost contact.

Salpa (C.C. Antonio Biondo) had sailed for a patrol off Cyrenaica but turned back due to weather damage and battery defects. On 26 October, off Cape Santa Maria di Leuca, she encountered the battleship Andrea Doria, proceeding at 18 knots from Pola to Taranto. Two rounds were fired in the direction of the submarine before her identity was recognised.

War with Greece

Since the summer, tensions were building up with Greece. In the early hours of 28 October, the Italian ambassador delivered an ultimatum to General Metaxas, the Greek dictator. This was immediately rejected. The same day, Italy invaded Greece. To support land operations, the submarines Corridoni, Delfino, Narvalo, Tricheco, and Zaffiro were sailed from Leros to patrol in the Aegean. Curiously, the Adriatic-based submarines were inactive, perhaps reflecting a general attitude that this war would be short, but reality would soon prove otherwise. However, the fear that British forces would occupy Crete materialised as Great Britain lost no time offering help to its new ally, and the Royal Navy was provided Suda as a base. As soon as it was known that Italy was at war with Greece, Italian minelaying submarines were ordered to execute their missions. At 0839 hours on 29 October, Atropo (C.C. Peppino Manca) started laying a minefield between Zante and Cape Crepito. However, after sixteen mines (thirty-six were intended) were laid, two mines exploded prematurely, and the mission was interrupted. Three hours later, Bragadino (C.C. Mario Vannutelli) laid another minefield of twenty-four mines off Navarino. It had been intended that submarines lay several minefields in Greek waters, including off Piraeus, Suda Bay, Monemvasia, Milo, Spinalonga (Crete), and the Doro and the Kaso Channels. Zoea was undergoing a refit at Taranto and was not immediately available. The loss of Foca and the fact that Zoea had narrowly missed her own destruction after the explosion of one of her mines in July, had raised some doubts as to the dependability of the weapon, and mine-laying operations by Italian submarines were abandoned. The idea was revived toward the end of the war, but the Armistice would intervene before it could be implemented.

Operation B.G.2

On 21 October, Scirè (C.C. Junio Valerio Borghese) sailed from La Spezia for a special operation. During the night of 30/31 October, she launched three human torpedoes to attack Gibraltar. Only the one mounted by T.V. Gino Birindelli and Secondo Capo Palombaro (diver) Damos Paccagnini approached the target before mechanical difficulties forced them to abandon the attempt. They were some 30 metres short of the battleship Barham. The maiale exploded but caused no damage. Birendelli was captured on the commercial mole, while Paccagnini was picked up by the trawler Empyrean. The other pairs (T.V. Luigi Durand de la Penne/Secondo Capo Palombaro Emilio Bianchi and Capitano G.N. Teseo Tesei/Sergente Palombaro Alcid Pedretti) failed to enter the base; the first due to mechanical and the second to physical difficulties but both managed to escape to Spanish territory.

Gibraltar had been violated, and though the operation was unsuccessful, it was an indication of better things to come. Borghese, who had brought his submarine close to the British naval base with great navigational skill and daring, was awarded the Medaglia d’Oro.

On the last day of the month, Bragadino was patrolling west of the coast of Morea. The destroyers HMS Diamond and Ilex located her and depth-charged her, but she managed to extricate herself from her predicament.

Atlantic

Italian submarine patrols in the Atlantic during October 1940

Emo (…3 October)	Otaria (…4 October)	Faà di Bruno (…4 October)
Tarantini (…4 October)	Giuliani (…5 October)	Torelli (…5 October)
Baracca (…5 October)	Glauco (…20 October)	Da Vinci (…31 October)
Calvi (1-23 October)	Tazzoli (2-24 October)	Argo (2-24 October)
Barbarigo (9-11 October)x	Malaspina (9 October…)	Dandolo (12 October…)
Barbarigo (14 October…)	Otaria (14 October…)	Bagnolini (24 October…)
Baracca (24 October…)	Finzi (24 October…)	Morosini (25 October…)
Marconi (27 October…)	Bianchi (27 October…)	Brin (28 October…)
Emo (31 October…)	Marcello (31 October…)	Faà di Bruno (31 October…)

On 1 October, approximately 400 miles west of Porto, after allowing the crew to take to the boats, Baracca (C.C. Enrico Bertarelli) sank the Greek Aghios Nicolaos (3,570 GRT, built 1915) by gunfire. She had been on a trip from Santa Fé to Belfast. Her crew of twenty-six was allowed to take two lifeboats. They became separated; Captain Giorgios Skinitis and eleven men were picked up by the Portuguese trawler Anna and landed at Figueira da Foz. The other fourteen survivors were picked up by a Spanish vessel and brought to Leixoes (south of La Coruña).

The next day, about 500 miles west of Lisbon, Da Vinci (C.C. Ferdinando Calda) encountered the armed merchant cruiser HMS Cilicia head-on and fired two torpedoes from 350 metres but missed. The torpedoes probably failed to explode as they had little time to arm themselves. In the quick action that followed, the submarine did not note the presence of the aircraft carrier Argus, who was just behind. The cruiser opened fire on the submerging submarine, firing thirteen rounds with her 6-inch guns before it disappeared underwater; none reached their mark. According to Cicilia’s report, the submarine had also fired three rounds in her direction, but there was no mention of it in Da Vinci’s patrol report, although it stated that the gunners were brought up.

After crossing the Straits of Gibraltar, Glauco (C.F. Giuseppe Mellina) had no better luck when, on 3 October, she attacked an escort vessel with three torpedoes but missed. The next day, she stopped the Spanish tanker Campero, bringing fuel from Port Arthur (Texas) to Barcelona, but released her upon examination. On 7 October, she failed to attack a convoy due to her commander’s indecision. He would later be removed from submarine command because of a ‘lack of offensive spirit’.

Operating off the Iberian Peninsula, Italian submarines were handicapped by the number of neutral vessels they encountered, and time was often wasted in fruitless pursuits. Fuel consumption, reputedly double at 12 knots than at 10 knots, made the chase slow, and it was often abandoned before interception could be achieved.

As more Italian submarines arrived at Bordeaux, the RAF continued its mining effort in the Gironde estuary, with four Hampden laying mines on the night of 1/2 October. Torelli (C.F. Aldo Cocchia) was met by the German Minesweeper M 12, and a French pilot was taken on board. She entered the Gironde but midway through, during the afternoon of 4 October, ran aground near Saint Yzans. She was freed after several attempts but ran aground again at dawn the next day. She finally reached Bordeaux without further mishaps. The same day, Baracca (C.C. Enrico Bertarelli) and Giuliani (C.C. Renato d’Elia) were met off Le Verdon by the German Minesweepers M 9 and M 13 and the Sperrbrecher Cap Hadid and escorted in. But danger lurked; the submarine HMS Tigris (Lt Cdr H F. Bone, RN) was cruising in the area and fired four torpedoes at the Italian submarines. Luckily, the torpedo tracks were observed in time, and they were all avoided. Bone mistakenly believed he had attacked three submarines, but only two were present.

During the night of 3/4 October, Nani (C.C. Gioacchino Polizzi) was about 60 miles east of the Gibraltar Strait when she sighted an 8,000-ton tanker and attacked it with a torpedo. It missed.  She crossed the Strait the following night and encountered the British armed trawler Kingston Saphire (356 tons) some 60 miles west of Cape Trafalgar. The latter was mistaken for a 7,000-ton tanker and sunk with a single stern torpedo. Three were killed, and twenty-eight survivors were picked up by the Spanish fishing vessel Nettuno and landed at Huelva. They were interned by Spanish authorities but were released at the end of the month.

On the morning of 4 October, Glauco (C.F. Giuseppe Mellina) stopped the Spanish tanker Campero (6,382 GRT, built 1934). She was carrying oil from Port Arthur (Texas) to Barcelona and was released after examination.

On the morning of 8 October, Calvi (C.C. Giuseppe Caridi) stopped the Spanish sailing vessel Angel de la Guardia off the Portuguese coast. She was carrying 120 tons of salt from Cadiz to Villanueva de Arosa (Galicia) and was released.

At dusk the same day, Da Vinci attacked a large freighter estimated at 20,000 tons with two torpedoes; this was the liner Highland Brigade (14,131 GRT, built 1929). Calda had difficulties in maintaining periscope depth because of the rough seas. Estimating the speed of the target at 12-16 knots, he chose to fire both torpedoes at the same angle but using a 533mm and a 450mm torpedo with different speeds. The nearest missed close astern as he had underestimated the speed of the liner and he had no chance to correct his mistake before Highland Brigade disappeared in the distance.

On the morning of 11 October, 150 miles southwest of Cape St. Vincent, Tazzoli (C.C. Vittore Raccanelli) observed a large convoy of forty ships on a northerly course over the horizon, but the heavy seas prevented her from closing. This was certainly convoy HG.45 which had sailed from Gibraltar on 9 October¹. Raccanelli waited ten hours before making an enemy report, which was later criticised by Admiral Parona. He had been informed of the departure of the convoy very quickly by Italian agents at Algeciras and had ordered Tazzoli, Veniero, Da Vinci, and Glauco to form a patrol line while Calvi farther to the southwest was told to be ready to join the fray. The delay in the report allowed the convoy to slip by the Italian patrol line without being attacked. Tazzoli was more fortunate the following day when she stopped the Yugoslav Orao (5,135 GRT, built 1919). The ship had already been intercepted by the destroyer HMS Hotspur and was being brought to Gibraltar with an armed guard. She was abandoned after being shelled and hit by a torpedo. She was supposed to bring a cargo of wheat to the United Kingdom but had elected to go to Lisbon instead. Two men were killed, and thirty-three survivors were picked up by the destroyers HMS Griffin and Gallant, who arrived on the scene with HMS Wishart and Vidette. Orao was found by the destroyers to be still afloat, but in a sinking condition, and HMS Wishart finished her off with a torpedo. The four destroyers then hunted the submarine without success.

Argo (T.V. Alberto Crepas) had made the Gibraltar crossing on 8 October and four days later fired a single torpedo at a freighter of 4,000 tons; this was probably the Royal Navy armed trawler Cape Barracouta who reported an attack fifty miles west of Cape St. Vincent. Argo stopped the Portuguese trawler Estrella Do Norte that same afternoon but released her upon examination. Shortly after, it was the turn of the Portuguese steamer Corvo on passage from Terceira to Lisbon to be intercepted by Glauco, but she was also let go. The following afternoon the Yugoslav Rosina Topic proceeding from Lisbon to New Jersey with a cargo of sugar was stopped by Cappellini (C.C. Salvatore Todaro) and also released.

The Kabalo incident

The Belgian Kabalo (5,191 GRT, built 1917), under Captain Georges Vogels, had sailed from Glasgow with general cargo for Freetown and joined convoy OB.223. On 8 October, the convoy had dispersed, and the old ship had proceeded independently to her destination. Kabalo was not a lucky ship; earlier in the year she had collided with the Belgian Flanders, and the latter had sunk. On the evening of 15 October, once again her bad luck caught up with her when a submarine was observed coming fast astern. This was Cappellini, who opened fire from about 2,000 metres. The Belgian ship was armed with a stern 4-inch gun and a Lewis machine gun and attempted to return fire, but the submarine’s third round hit the stern and set it afire, forcing the gunners to abandon their station. Despite heavy seas (Force 4-5), which prevented the submarine from using her forward gun, fire from the stern gun was ably directed by the executive officer T.V. Athos Fraternale, who would later command the submarine Morosini with distinction and earn the sobriquet of the Musketeer of the Atlantic. Kabalo now attempted to escape, but her old engines were no match to the submarine’s, and the range now diminished rapidly. Todaro now maneuvered his boat and fired successively three torpedoes, two of 533mm and one of 450mm but all missed, the first two possibly running under the target. However, the freighter was repeatedly hit by gunfire, and Captain Vogels had no choice but to order the ship to be abandoned. The Belgian vessel had several Congolese sailors, and one of them, Pierre Essenden, had been seriously sick and had to be carried out on the back of one of his companions to the lifeboat. A shell exploded nearby, and the unfortunate man was hit by fragments and expired on the spot. He was the only victim of the shelling. By this time, lifeboat No. 2 was manned by the First Officer, Isidore Mesmaekers, and fifteen survivors, who quickly put up their sail and sped away to the northwest. Lifeboat No. 1, with Captain Vogels and twenty survivors, was also underway when it was realised that five men had been left behind, and the boat returned to rescue them. The five men leapt to the sea, but the waves kept throwing them back on the sinking ship, and the lifeboat was unable to pick them up. Only their life vests prevented them from drowning in the cold waters. They were saved in extremis by the submarine, which was circling its victim and picked them up. By this time, the Belgian ship had disappeared beneath the waves. When it was learned that there were two boats loaded with survivors, Todaro attempted to reach them. Only lifeboat No. 1 was found, and Captain Vogels was invited on board Cappellini with the promise that Todaro would try to find the second boat. The submarine searched for lifeboat No. 2 in vain during the night but failed to locate it. At daylight, Cappellini returned to take lifeboat No. 1 in tow, and the twenty-six survivors were now crammed in it. The following night, there was a moment of panic when the towing cable broke, and the submarine disappeared in the darkness. Fortunately, the mishap was realised in time, the submarine returned, and a new line was passed. The following day, it became clear that it was difficult to tow the boat with its load in heavy seas, and twenty-two survivors embarked on the submarine. But even then, the lifeboat was now taking on water, and the last four men had to join their companions on board the submarine. On 19 October, Cappellini reached the island of Santa Maria in the Azores and landed the grateful survivors. In the meantime, lifeboat No. 2 had been located by the Panamanian tanker Panam and the sixteen men were brought to Lisbon. Captain Vogels and his group found passage to Ponta Delgada on a schooner and finally sailed on the Portuguese steamer Carvalho Araújo for Lisbon, where they were reunited with the other survivors. The extraordinary compassion displayed by Todaro was in great contrast with the concept of total war, which was being carried out on the high seas. This would not be his last gesture of chivalry, and he would be remembered as the “Knight of the Atlantic.” Yet, his humanity was criticised by Admiral Parona as the latter felt that Todaro had “uselessly endangered his boat.”

On 17 October, Barbarigo (C.C. Giulio Ghiglieri) spotted an aircraft; she immediately dived and heard explosions. The attack carried out by Sunderland ‘D’ (N9050) of 10 Squadron (RAAF), piloted by Squadron Leader C.W. Pearce, was actually directed at the nearby Otaria (C.C. Giuseppe Vocaturo). Otaria remained on the surface, believing the aircraft to be German, a challenge was made but the aircraft strafed her as she replied with her machine guns. The Italian submarine dived at the first opportunity, and the Sunderland dropped four bombs without causing serious damage.

On the same day, the first contact between Axis submarines was made when Malaspina (C.F. Mario Leoni) encountered U–37 (KL Oehrn) and exchanged recognition signals. However, future contacts would be few and far between as Admiral Dönitz preferred that the two submarine arms fight separate wars.

Just after midnight on 20 October, 350 miles southwest of Reykjavik, Malaspina exchanged fire with the Dutch Bussum (3,636 GRT, built 1917) four times; she launched single torpedoes, but the target escaped. The following month, Bussum would be sunk by U–100.

Luck was on Tazzoli’s side on 22 October. She was about to reach Bordeaux when she was missed by six torpedoes (one of which apparently hit but failed to explode) from HMS Talisman, who had taken over the patrol off the Gironde from Tigris. The British submarine opened fire, and the Italian submarine prudently escaped by diving as the enemy was firing from the dark horizon and was hardly visible. Raccanelli would incur criticism from Admiral Parona that his submarine was armed with two 120mm guns and would have outgunned his British opponent.

While on her way to New York, luck was on the side of the Greek steamer Souliotis (4,300 GRT, built 1917) as she was intercepted on 22 October by Nani (C.C. Gioacchino Polizzi) but released upon examination. A week later, the submarine would have been justified to sink her as Italy declared war on Greece. On 27 October, the Italian submarine made it up by sinking with gunfire Meggie (1,583 GRT, built 1889) from convoy OB.228. The Swedish ship carried 4,000 tons of coal from the United Kingdom to Madeira. Again, the Italian submariners displayed an unusual spirit of chivalry when Nani towed the two lifeboats with a total of twenty-one survivors for twelve hours toward the island of San Miguel (Azores). Polizzi stopped the towing when the lifeboats kept lights on, which he felt exposed his submarine to unnecessary risks. Fortunately, the survivors reached the Azores safely; there were no casualties.

The same day, off the Azores, Cappellini stopped the French Marcelle with a warning shot. She was on passage from St. Pierre and Miquelon to Casablanca (although she disclosed her origin as Bordeaux) and was allowed to continue her voyage. In the afternoon, Baracca encountered the German raider Schiff 21 (HSK-3 Widder), who was on her way to Brest. They just exchanged recognition signals before parting ways.

Italian submarines were now operating from Bordeaux and patrolling west of Ireland. They were unaccustomed to the harsh weather and had great difficulties adjusting.

On 30 October, Finzi (C.C. Alberto Dominici) fired a single torpedo at a 6-8,000-ton armed steamer but missed and was depth-charged in the process. Barbarigo could not catch up with another ship, and the heavy weather prevented her from making more than 12 knots. Otaria attempted to close a steamer, which proved to be the British Baltrover, on passage from Liverpool to St. John’s (Newfoundland). The vessel opened fire on the submarine, forcing her to break off the chase as water penetrated through her hatch.

On the last day of the month, Dandolo had similar problems when she attempted to intercept a convoy Malaspina reported and had to abandon the pursuit. The Italian submarines did not have exhaust pipes for the diesels such as their German counterparts and were forced to keep their hatches open when proceeding on the surface with the inevitable consequence that tons of water entered the boat when waves rolled over the submarine. The problem would have to be remedied in the Bordeaux arsenal.

The same day, Baracca fired a single torpedo at an unidentified steamer of about 3-4,000 tons and missed. The vessel attempted to ram her without success.

To distinguish them from their German counterparts, the Seekriegsleitung assigned ‘I’ numbers (for Italien, also referred to as ‘J’) to the twenty-seven Italian submarines in the Atlantic:

I 1 Calvi	I 10 Baracca	I 19 Mocenigo
I 2 Finzi	I 11 Bianchi	I 20 Morosini
I 3 Tazzoli	I 12 Bagnolini	I 21 Nani
I 4 Cappellini	I 13 Tarantini	I 22 Veniero
I 5 Faà di Bruno	I 14 Giuliani	I 23 Brin
I 6 Malaspina	I 15 Barbarigo	I 24 Glauco
I 7 Marconi	I 16 Dandolo	I 25 Otaria
I 8 Da Vinci	I 17 Emo	I 26 Argo
I 9 Torelli	I 18 Marcello	I 27 Velella

Red Sea and Indian Ocean

Italian submarine patrols in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean during October 1940

Archimede (5-11 October)	Ferraris (12-18 October)	Guglielmotti (19-24 October)
Ferraris (20-23 October)	Archimede (24-30 October)	Salpa (24-26 October)

No notable event.

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1. Convoy HG.45: forty-nine ships escorted by the minesweeper HMS Gleaner and the destroyers HMS Hotspur and HMS Firedrake (the last two to the limit of their endurance). ↩︎