Post-script
It is difficult to assess the role of the Italian Submarine Fleet in the Second World War, and the subject will be debated for a long time. Certainly, there were great expectations at the declaration of war, but several factors would quash them early on. At the outset of the war, it was believed to be the largest underwater fleet in the World[1]. Yet, the sudden expansion failed to keep up with technical developments, and its manpower showed uneven training. Italy’s greatest potential enemy was France, and the Italian Navy could match its rival in a war, but war with Great Britain was another proposition. Italy was very short of war materials, and her military budget was only one-fourth of the United Kingdom’s. The Campaign in Norway had depleted the Kriegsmarine, and in the summer of 1940, her surface fleet was reduced to a heavy cruiser, a light cruiser, and four destroyers. The brunt of the war at sea would inevitably fall on the Regia Marina.
At the beginning of the war, fifty-four submarines were over five years old. Submarines were considered obsolete after ten years, which meant nearly half the force was beginning to show its age.
The loss of ten submarines in the first three weeks of the war came as a great shock. The scale of the operations could not be sustained, or the submarine fleet would cease to exist before the end of the year. This was attributed to the clear waters of the Mediterranean, which did not shield the submarine adequately, and the modern antisubmarine methods developed by the adversary with its “Hastig” (sic, Asdic), whose performance was still a mysterious factor. The operations had to be curtailed until a solution was found. Another element was the deficiency of Italian industries. The output of torpedoes of the 21-inch type had not kept pace with the construction of submarines in the 1930s. When it appeared obvious, at the end of the summer of 1940, that the Luftwaffe had failed to bring England to her knees, Mediterranean submarines were instructed not to carry reloads, a confession of the shortage situation.
Submarine construction, which had seen such an expansion in pre-war years, had virtually halted. Alessandro Malaspina was completed a few days after the war began, and Maggiore Baracca a month later. No other submarine would be completed before the end of the year, only eight (and six midgets of limited value) in 1941 and ten in 1942. These were insufficient to replace losses, and the strength of the submarine force was expected to decline. By contrast, the German and British submarine forces would steadily increase despite the losses incurred.
The Regia Marina did not have the luxury to expend its submarine force in an all-out war. It had correctly foreseen that the war would take years. Consequently, it had to keep its Mediterranean force “in being” until new units could arrive in significant numbers in 1943 or face the possibility of being wiped out in a few months. Hence, patrols in this sea would be short and avoid areas with significant risks. The war in the Mediterranean appeared to provide few returns for the efforts deployed. There was little prospect of mercantile warfare. Enemy shipping was scarce. When convoys were sent to Malta, they were made up of fast ships, heavily escorted, and difficult to intercept and hit. It was more frequent to encounter enemy warships, but again these travelled fast and proved elusive targets.
Attacks were carried out by “eye,” relying on complex tables to determine the torpedo angles. They were not equipped with a “fruit machine” or torpedo data computer, in use by the British, American, and German submarine fleets. Nor was the commander trained in a rigorous “perisher” course, as favoured in the Royal Navy, to improve his attack skills. Despite these shortcomings, some commanders managed to achieve very credible scores. A more aggressive war in the Mediterranean could have produced better results, as achievements indeed paled compared to their German colleagues, but it would have been short-lived and come at a terrible cost.
We can hardly fault Maricosom for its cautiousness and consideration for the lives of its submariners. At the same time, Admiral Doenitz sacrificed his own “wolves” even when it was obvious there were few prospects for results.
In retrospect, it is easy to express criticism, but in 1940, Axis victory appeared imminent, and there was little incentive to waste men and material. By contrast, the war in the Atlantic provided more tangible results. Beginnings were challenging, but the Betasom submarines had arrived in this theatre one year late. By this time, German U-boats had time to hone their skills, but so did the British antisubmarine tactics. Italian submariners did not have much time to adapt to wolf-pack tactics. When they showed signs of coming into their groove, the Germans requested they return to the Mediterranean. However, these large submarines had little prospect of better success in the confined waters of the Middle Sea, where air threat was more frequent and were an early indicator of the defeat of the U-boats in the Atlantic. Nevertheless, a handful of submarines remained at Bordeaux and were available when Operation PAUKENSCHLAG was unleashed on the Americas. They showed they could achieve excellent results given time for adaptation and training. Italian submariners did not lack courage, as they showed in their involvement in numerous gun battles
In July 1943, Italian submarines were called upon to perform the ultimate sacrifice in the defence of their homeland. By this time, Admiral Doenitz had admitted defeat in the Battle of the North Atlantic, and the situation in the Mediterranean was only worse. Axis submarines were now hunted mercilessly. They could no longer count on the dark hours to recharge their batteries. The enemy could locate them with air-to-surface radar and illuminate them with the Leigh light to deliver lethal attacks. They fought to the end, even when it was obvious that victory could no longer be achieved,
Yet, by the time of the Armistice, the Regia Marina was still a potent force and a valuable pawn to obtain favourable terms. The Navy and its submarines were sacrificed for the survival of the Motherland.
There can be no better epitaph.
[1] The Soviet Navy had the largest submarine fleet but it was divided into four main theatres of operations.